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ABSTRACT
QUIDAM HOMO EST ASINUS: THE ORGINALITY AND INFLUENCE OF PETER
ABELARD UPON MEDIEVAL THOUGHT
Timothy Ernst
November 28,2011
Historians and philosophers alike remember Peter Abelard as the most brilliant, original,
and influential philosopher of the twelfth century. Much ofthis reputation stems not
from Abelard's intellectual contributions but due to Abelard's scandalous personal life
and the nonexistence of documents of Abelard's contemporary philosophers. Though
brilliant, Abelard exerted little influence through his ideas. Unlike a modem professor
who changes the paradigms of his discipline with innovative theses, Abelard was a skilled
teacher who sought to teach students the skills they required to advance their careers
within a reformed Catholic Church, which was newly interested in logic, philosophy, and
theology. Seen from this perspective, Abelard has much more in common with his
contemporary intellectuals and is more consistent with the context of his age than the
secondary scholarship typically recognizes.
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HISTORIOGRAPHY

Peter Abelard was among the most famous intellectuals of the Christian West in
the twelfth century, but today few people besides specialists in medieval history and
philosophy know anything of him. I The nature of the documentary evidence is partially
to blame. Abelard devoted a large portion of his own writing to logic and theology, two
difficult subjects for non-specialists to understand. Even specialists within these
disciplines may have trouble with Abelard's writings due to the differences between
standardized logical and theological terminology of twelfth-century France and the
present. Thirteenth-century philosophy and theology is better represented in academia
and even in more popular studies as well. Philosophers like Aquinas or Bonaventure
wrote on a wider variety of topics, many of which are highly appealing to those in search
of spiritual writings. Abelard wrote on spiritual matters as well, but always through the
eye of the logician; every term had to be scrupulously defined and consistently used and
every implication of every definition thoroughly probed for the sake of validity. Such
work must have been labor intensive to think and write, and it is often challenging to
read, especially for those who lack an appreciation of formal logic and are more
concerned with the content of an argument than its form.
If his intellectual writings were all Abelard left behind, he might have been of
interest only to philosophers and intellectual historians, but he also left an autobiography,
I

M.T. Clanchy, Abelard: A Medieval Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), I.

the Historia Calamitatum, as well as a number of letters to his lover and wife Heloise.
These sources account for much of the continued interest in Abelard, because they are
fundamentally different from much of the self-conscious writing of previous eras and
reveal a great deal of scandal, sex, and difficulties in Abelard's personal life. When
historians or popular audiences who are ill-suited for logical analysis or theological
argument could make little sense of Abelard's most important works, they could always
tum to his sentimental writings for steamy romance and stories of his persecution at the
hands of the Church. Credulity of the veracity of Abelard's claims is unwarranted; like
any autobiography the Historia Calamitatum is a heavily biased source full of holes on
subjects on which Abelard preferred to remain silent, but unlike many autobiographies of
his age it makes reference to real people and events rather than to spiritual archetypes. 2
The document also clearly reveals its author's personality. Though he frames the
book as a letter of consolation to an unnamed friend, Abelard consistently demonstrates
his arrogant, contentious nature far more than he consoles. So great was his conceit that
he believed however terrible his friend's sufferings were, they were "in truth nought, or at
the most but of small account,,3 in comparison with his own. Despite its bias, the

Historia Calamitatum is a rich source for the historian due to its reflection of Abelard's
psychology. The degree of individuality it exhibits has often led historians to use Abelard
as an archetypical example of an intellectual during a new age in European history which
they frequently dub the "Twelfth-Century Renaissance."
Urban Holmes claims the term "Renaissance" should be defined prior to debate
2 Ibid., 124.
3 Christopher Brooke, The Twelfth Century Renaissance (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1970),
24; Henry Adams Bellows, trans., The Story of My Misfortunes: The Autobiography ofPeter Abelard
(Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), xxii.

2

concerning its applicability:
The word 'Renaissance' itself is something that we must define at the outset. We
pay too much attention to the etymological sense, that of 'rebirth,' and forget how
the word is actually used by most of us. In this connection a renaissance is not
necessarily the rebirth of anything. It is a sudden increase of enthusiasm and
intensity in a given stream of culture. It does not have to be implied that new
materials, new models, have been produced from somewhere. The quickening of
enthusiasm comes from some catalyst-to use the terminology of chemistrywhich produces an intense and brilliant reaction in a continuous current which is
already there. Once enthusiasm has been aroused there is, of course, a search for
new materials and enlarged knowledge is an inevitable result. In studying the
circumstances of a renaissance we must endeavor to define the current of ideas
which was present and to evaluate the nature of the catalyst which suddenly
appeared. 4
During the twelfth century a sudden increase in enthusiasm for the Latin classics, law,
theology, philosophy, art, architecture, and vernacular poetry developed. 5 Abelard rose
out of and contributed to some of these developments through his study of philosophy
and theology. Many historians have described the twelfth century as a renaissance and
Abelard as a fixture of it, but this description has not been universally accepted.
The first historian to use the term was Charles Homer Haskins, who in 1927
published a book titled after the term which was intended primarily for students and those
with an amateur interest in the period. Haskins, much like Abelard with his theological
writings, wrote the book on the basis of his own students finding it difficult to believe
that the middle ages was a period of anything other than barbarism and ignorance. This
erroneous view of the Middle Ages has proven quite durable despite the efforts of
historians to correct it. In order to emphasize that the Italian Renaissance was not such a
great divergence from trends in the twelfth century, Haskins applied the term to show the

Urban T. Holmes, Jr., "The Idea ofa Twelfth-Century Renaissance," Speculum 26, no. 4 (October
1951): 643.
5 Brooke, The Twelfih Century Renaissance, 13.

4

3

continuity between the eras. 6
As a celebrity of twelfth-century France, Abelard figures heavily into Haskins's
survey, though Haskins's analysis is flawed, particularly with regard to the problem of
universals and particulars, the great debate in logic in the twelfth century. Particulars are
easy enough to grasp even for those unfamiliar with the issue. They are nothing more
than the individual entities which make up the world of experience. Universals are a bit
more difficult to classify. Abstractly, they are the categories into which the human mind
sorts its experience of particulars and are signified by terms like "animal" or "human
being" according to the claims of realists and conceptualists. The debate considered how
universals should be regarded. Realists claimed them to be real things just as particulars
are real things, while nominalists believed they were only words. Abelard is often
associated with the nominalist camp due to his famous claim in the Logica Ingredientibus
that "it remains to ascribe universality to utterances alone,,,7 but there is no consensus as
to exactly what Abelard's view of the problem should be called. Often debates of this
kind seem to be little more than wrangling with definitions only for the sake of mental
gymnastics, but Haskins clearly understood the eventual implications of nominalism and
why they were important. All sorts of concepts such as the Church, Christendom, or
more abstract matters of doctrine like the Trinity involve universals, and unless universals
are upheld as real things all sorts of problematic questions on these subjects come to the
fore. 8
According to Haskins's view nominalism is a sort of intellectual anarchism, but
6 Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance ofthe Twelfth Century (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1957), v.
7 Richard N. Bosley and Martin Tweedale, eds., Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy: Selected Readings
Presenting the Interactive Discourses Among the Major Figures (Peterborough: Broadview Press,
1997), 383.
8 Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, 352.
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twelfth-century nominalism was more a form of anti-realism than of Pyrrhic skepticism.
It denied, he says, the validity of the realists' arguments, because no known thing fit the
definition of a universal, which is not quite the same thing as claiming that universals
were only metaphysical detritus. Later versions of nominalism were much more extreme
in their attacks on the existence of universals, and claiming a link between the two, as
Haskins does, without studying the change in the context of the debate is an error.
Like many other historians, Haskins also misinterprets Abelard's Sic et Non. This
misinterpretation comes about as a result of the human mind's desire to find convenient
explanations for inconvenient facts or a lack of firm evidence and connections within a
narrative. In the Sic et Non, Abelard collected and arranged hundreds of quotations from
scripture and the patristic thinkers such as Augustine, Jerome, and Origen. He collated
them around several differing questions in which he had personal interest and organized
the responses into those who answered "yes" and those which responded "no." This
method was of great importance to the questio, which would become the dominant
academic method from the thirteenth century onward, though Abelard did not invent it
nor was he the only man in his period to use it. Several scholars from the nineteenth
century forward have been confused by Abelard's failure to provide a definitive answer to
the questions he raises in the Sic et Non. Their response has been to further reinforce the
idea that nominalists were intellectual anarchists, free thinkers, or rebels against Church
authority. They claimed, as Haskins does, that showing the contradictions between
authoritative sources undermined the Church's ability to define doctrine. 9 Abelard's
silence seems especially pressing when Sic et Non is compared to the Sentences of Peter

9 Ibid., 355.
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Lombard, which does give an authoritative resolution to the contradictions, but Abelard
and Lombard had different goals and different audiences for their respective works.
These facts are typically misconstrued or ignored when an author wishes to argue that the
middle ages were a time of powerful intellectual ferment which an anti-intellectual
Church attempted to quash. Holding up Abelard as a free thinker serves to show that
intellectual activity was more than parroting the official line of the Church, but the
number of philosophers accused of heresy, including Abelard himself, illustrate this fact
quite well. The juxtaposition of discordant authorities in the Sic et Non serves a more
subtle and rudimentary purpose than Haskins succeeded in realizing.
Roger Llyod's work differed little from Haskins's. He maintains the usage of
"renaissance" as a term to define the twelfth century, though his survey focuses more on
personalities like John of Salisbury, whom Haskins had not considered as thoroughly.
Llyod found the century to be sui generis due to its outpouring of creativity. 10 He
attempted to draw a connection between the major individuals he considered and their
greater context to forge "a via media between the view of Carlyle that the hero makes
history, and the more fashionable view of the Marxists that the hunger of the anonymous
masses is history'S differentiating term."ll Examination of the intellectual contributions
of the period gave Llyod ample documentary evidence. Most people of the day, of
course, never wrote anything, while the more practical political and economic documents
fail to provide the flavor of the times found in intellectual and personal documents that is
a necessary ingredient in reconstructing the mentality of the time.
Jacques Le Goff wrote on the era firmly from the position of social history in his
10 Roger LJyod, The Golden Middle Age (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 5.
II Ibid., viii.
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Intellectuals in the Middle Ages, but his interpretation is heavily ideological. In the
United States, Le Goff might be politically lumped together with professors like Noam
Chomsky, who are sometimes referred to as "left wing libertarians." They tend to distrust
both government and corporate business, which they see as tools of oppression. Abelard
for Le Goff represents a rarely achieved ideal: a man who controls his own labor and is
therefore independent of coercive economic or political control. Le Goff goes so far as to
refer to Abelard as the "first professor,"12 even though Abelard's activity differed
markedly from that of a modem university professor. For Le Goff, intellectuals
represented a distinct class in the middle ages because they made their way in the world
by selling their knowledge through teaching and writing.13 While teachers like Abelard
had at least to be secular clerics and therefore members of the Church, they did not
perform the same functions as priests or higher clergy who administered sacraments and
the Church or the monks, who truly were the oratores, since much of their time was
devoted to prayer and contemplation. Intellectuals were also more dependent than Le
Goff would like to believe, while few twelfth-century intellectuals remained within that
station throughout their lives. John of Salisbury, for example, became an archbishop.
Had the circumstances of his life been different, Abelard himself may have joined the
ranks of the upper clergy. His decision to study theology rather than remain a mere
logician displays that he had ambition for higher office within the Church, while the
political patronage he received from Stephen de Garlande illustrates at least some
dependence.

12 Jacques Le Goff, Intellectuals in the Middle Ages, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (Cambridge:
Blackwell, 1993),35.
13 Ibid., 1.
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For being so concerned with intellectuals in the middle ages, Le Goff also often
misunderstands their concerns. He claims that nominalism argued that words signify
things and are therefore based on reality, but this is in fact the claim of realism that
twelfth-century nominalism argues against. 14 For nominalists a word e.g., "Peter"
signifies since it refers to Abelard, but a word e.g., "horse" can only be predicated of an
actual horse and therefore is not an extramental universal thing. Le Goff's error so
simplifies the debate between nominalists and realists that it makes their contention seem
juvenile. He also follows Haskins's incorrect appraisal of Sic et Non. 1s Abelard figures
heavily into Le Goff's argument, and so construing him as the ultimate twelfth-century
free thinker was distinctly to his advantage, even if the description was not quite valid.
Sidney Packard made a more radical iteration of Haskins's thesis: the twelfth
century renaissance was not an earlier, separate renaissance, but the beginning of a
continuum that ended with the Italian Renaissance. 16 Originally published in the late
1920s, Haskins's thesis was nearly a half century old and had begun to show its age by
the time Packard published his work in 1973. According to Packard, scholars in the
twelfth century began to move past the immediate implications of the texts they had to
more original arguments and were much less isolated from each other than they had been
in the past. 1? While this may be true, that seems a poor reason to bind the twelfth century
to the Italian Renaissance, a period occurring centuries and several world changing
events later.
Abelard is always an important figure for anyone who argues for a "renaissance"
14 Ibid., 45.
15 Ibid.
16 Sidney P. Packard, 12th Century Europe: An Interpretive Essay (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1973), 150.
17 Ibid., 180.
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of the twelfth century, but Packard, in contrast with many other historians, refers to him
as a conceptualist. 18 While realists believe universals exist as things or in things, and
nominalists believe universals are words rather than things, conceptualists claim
universals do have real existence but as images within the mind and as words. Abelard is
sometimes referred to as a conceptualist due to a few of the ambiguities in his writings on
universals and particulars.
R.N. Swanson takes a contrary position to Packard, claiming that the middle ages
were generally a series of "renaissances." 19 Swanson's claim illustrates a deep problem
with the continued use of this term: if it can be applied to anything-and the period of
history from the time of Charlemagne to fifteenth century Italy has been described as
every type of renaissance or series of renaissances imaginable-the term is too loose to
mean anything. Swanson did not foolishly engage in meaningless semantics, for his book
is a survey targeted primarily at students just beginning to delve into medieval studies
who still suffer under the misconception that the entirety of the medieval period may be
described as the dark ages. Swanson is satisfied with continued use of the term
"renaissance" to describe the twelfth century so long, as he says, the label is understood
to be "only a label, but one applicable to something recognizable (although perhaps not
instantly) as a movement with profound repercussions and implications, and with a
certain integrity. ,,20
Though he attempts to illustrate medieval intellectual sophistication, Swanson
provides an incomplete introduction to the problem of universals. He misuses some of
18 Ibid., 187.
19 R.N. Swanson, The Twelfth-Century Renaissance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999),
210.
20 Ibid., 210.
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the terminology by lumping each of Porphyry's categories other than genus and species
together as accidents. A full treatment of the complex problem of universals would be
misplaced in a brief survey, especially when the goal is merely to illustrate that medieval
intellectuals, "renaissance men" that they were, were quite capable of engaging in
abstract debate, but oversimplification of a complex debate disadvantages the student
who attempts to research the primary literature and finds that accident was not defined
quite as Swanson claims it was.
Though Haskins's thesis has had a long academic life, it has also had a fair share
of critics. Eva Matthews Sanford delivered a presentation on possible flaws in Haskins's
thesis which she later converted into an article for Speculum. Sanford attacks Haskins's
claim from the position both of historical evidence and semantic definition. Historically,
people of the twelfth century did not consider themselves radically different from or
better than those of the preceding age, while those of the Italian Renaissance viewed
people who lived just a century before them as barbarians. 21 She also takes issue with
some of Haskins's chronology. Haskins claims the twelfth-century renaissance lasted
until 1250, but following the traditional date for the beginning of the Italian Renaissance
in 1300, a scant fifty years separates the two. While dates like this are always arbitrary,
Sanford fails to see a significant reason to differentiate the Italian from the TwelfthCentury Renaissance if the issue is only a separation of five decades. 22 Though she does
find some utilitarian use for the term as an analogy to explain to students that not
everything about the medieval period was ignorance, superstition, and brutality, anyone

21 Eva Matthew Sanford, "The Twelfth Century-Renaissance or Proto-Renaissance?" Speculum 26, no.
4 (October 1951): 636.
22 Ibid., 635.
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who uses the term must keep in mind that it is only an analogy and not a real thing whose
qualities historians should be arguing over.23
Following Sanford's advice, Christopher Brook questioned the use of the label but
did not discard it entirely. Sanford and Brook play nominalists to Haskins's realist.
Brook in particular emphasizes how those skilled in rhetoric and disputation can make
the ethereal seem to be flesh:
It must be firmly stated at the outset that the phrase "the twelfth century
Renaissance" has no precise meaning. It carries overtones, and these are essential
to understanding an exciting epoch in human history. We are still far from a full
comprehension of the depths of the love of men of that age for the antique, or of
the meaning of twelfth century humanism. But it is vain to search for a definition.
Historians love to use labels of this kind; and in the hands of a master they can
assume real meaning. 24

Stephen Jaeger goes to greater extremes in questioning the label. He finds no reason to
use it at all. At best it was a term of convenience which scholars continued to use due to
academic inertia, since the invention of the term made discussing the era easier, even
though the documentary evidence never demonstrated the merit of it. 25 He focuses his
analysis on John of Salisbury and Otto of Freising, who are often upheld as the epitomes
of the twelfth-century renaissance for the literary style they used to chronicle the events
of their day. Although Abelard typically represents the philosopher while his great foe St.
Bernard plays the role of the archetypal monk and power broker, John and Otto may be
better sources to consult on the view of the era itself, however, since their goal was to
write about their times rather than explore the depths of human reason and divine
mystery. Jaeger finds both men to be possessed of a deep seated pessimism regarding
23 Ibid., 641.
24 Brooke, The Twelfth Century Renaissance, 13.
25 Stephen Jaeger, "Pessimism in the Twelfth Century 'Renaissance,'" Speculum 78, no. 4 (October
2003): 1152.
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their age and a preference for the scholarship and direction of world affairs from the
preceding century rather than the forward-looking optimism typically associated with the
later Italian Renaissance. 26 If the term "twelfth-century renaissance" is understood
primarily as an analogy, Jaegar's claims may not make much difference, but the human
mind all too often confuses the metaphorical for the real, and he is likely correct in
claiming historians would be better off scrapping the term altogether.
Without the term, history seems to be at a loss though. Clearly the twelfth century
was different from what came before and after it, perhaps to enough of a degree that it
should be viewed as a discontinuity. R.I. Moore, most often quoted as an expert on
medieval heresy and religious dissent, finds the word "revolution" to be an appropriate
term for the period of which the twelfth-century renaissance is an intellectual
manifestation. Some historians have described the Gregorian reform movement of the
Church in the eleventh century as a revolution, but Moore wishes to apply the term more
broadly and for a longer duration; his book covers Europe from 970 until 1215. This
seems impossibly long for a revolution, which is typically conceived of as a quick,
sudden change. Moore admits that this change took quite a number of years, but the
effects of the change were radical enough that it should be called revolutionary.
Moore sees a discontinuity between the organized, powerful civilization in Europe
in the thirteenth century and the preceding period of feudal anarchy that resulted from the
collapse of the Carolingian Empire. Eventually the chaos in politics and religion became
too much to bear, and people began to support initiatives that would bring order out of the
chaos. The Church instigated two such movements with the Peace of God and Gregorian

26 Ibid., 1182-1183.
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refonn, but the secular world also attempted to make life more predictable by tying
laborers to the land to ensure they perfonned the requisite labor to generate surpluses
when fonnerly the nobility had been more concerned with doling out land as a reward for
military service. This control of labor allowed those in power to exploit it more
efficiently. With surplus food, not everyone needed to fann, and surplus workers could
build cities and produce artifacts for trade while others could join the Church or use their
intellectual talents in the management of this new system. 27
Moore's thesis could be criticized for equivocating "revolution" with
"renaissance," but between the two terms, Moore's is more appropriate. His claim that the
period of feudal anarchy immediately prior to what is typically referred to as the twelfthcentury renaissance marked the beginning of an attempt to bring order out of chaos not
only correctly understands human nature-surely it must not have taken long for the
typical medieval man or woman to grow weary of the constant feudal warfare between
the knights and desire some safety, security, and a return to a more centralized political
regime-but it also explains why intellectuals like Abelard or Gratian attempted to
resolve the apparent contradictions in authoritative sources. The desire for order was so
strong that it transcended politics and economics and manifested even in academia.
Several of the movements Moore discusses definitely have the flavor of revolution as
well. The Gregorian refonn movement had a vanguard and an ideology, and it along with
the restructuring of labor hurt and displaced many people who became unsure of how
they fit into society afterward. The world of 1215 was certainly vastly different from the
world of 970, and the great Gothic cathedrals, the sum mae of Aquinas, or the poetry of

27 R.I. Moore, The First European Revolution, c. 970 -1215 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): 36-38.
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Dante may not have been possible were it not for the changes that occurred in this period.
This raises the question of how Abelard himself fits into this era; he could be seen as a
reflection of the prevailing trends, a catalyst for the world to come, both, or neither.
Recent intellectual histories on such a subject are harder to find. Though it is
ironic that such a subject is underrepresented in the secondary literature given the
frequent citations of Abelard as representative of an intellectual awaking in Europe, the
rise of social history and "history from below" methodologies has led to a neglect of
intellectual issues and figures, since intellectuals are by defmition part of the elite class
that leaves behind documents. While many of Abelard's contemporaries may have been
intensely interested in speculative academic issues such as universals or the Trinity, the
peasant toiling in the fields had not the education, leisure, or enthusiasm for such debate,
though he did make up the vast majority of the population. Despite their small numbers,
intellectuals often do play an important part in the milieu of an era. By defining terms,
beliefs, and values they influence the way a society at large thinks. David Luscombe and
Constance Bouchard have written on the intellectual climate of the twelfth century.
Luscombe focuses specifically on Abelard and his influence while Bouchard considers a
wider array of evidence to construct an argument on the life of the mind in twelfthcentury France generally.
Luscombe in The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence ofAbelard's Thought in

the Early Scholastic Period traces the dissemination of copies of Abelard's writings and
studies the texts of students of Abelard to pinpoint the nature of his influence on later
intellectuals. 28 He argues that while several of Abelard's texts were widely read, he did
28 D.E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard: The lrifluence ofAbelard's Thought in the Early
Scholastic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), ix.
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not exert as much influence as the number of manuscripts containing pieces of his
writings might attest. Pope Innocent II sentenced Abelard to perpetual silence at Sens
and forbade his students from advocating or defending his errant ideas, while Abelard's
methods of logic and theology were often also practiced by his contemporaries who
became his critics and enemies. Luscombe determines that Abelard "was less a teacher
of truth than an analyst and a receiver of formulae and of the mass of auctoritas."29 He
did not influence the future through his original arguments, which were condemned, as
much as he taught methods for researching, interpreting and evaluating authoritative
evidence, skills the schools of Laon and St. Victor also taught.
Bouchard upholds Abelard as a prime example of her argument, but she oversteps
the boundaries of her evidence. She claims that the intellectual discourse of the twelfth
century was based on contradictions. She sees this not as a struggle to come to proper
arguments by examining possible opposing truth claims so much as a desire to maintain
"opposites that both denied and required each other.,,30 Though such a claim seems
postmodem, Bouchard's monograph is too thoroughly researched and her writing too
clear for it to be considered a work of that camp. Nonetheless, her claim is impossible to
support due to an inherent misunderstanding of what a contradiction is. If two statements
are contradictory, they cannot both be maintained, for affirming one requires the negation
of the other. Her conceptualization of a contradiction is actually a false dilemma. She
claims that this "contradiction-as-worldview" resulted from Gregorian reform, which
divided the world into the secular and the ecclesiastical as opposing categories for people,

29 Ibid., 308.
30 Constance Brittain Bouchard, "Every Valley Shall Be Exalted": The Discourse ojOpposites in TwelfthCentury Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), ix.
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but she seems not to grasp that secular and ecclesiastical are not contradictions but
contraries, since animals or rocks are neither secular nor ecclesiastical. Even when royal
power and the Church did not view each other favorably, they still frequently relied on
each other, indicating perhaps that these categories were not as clear and distinct in the
twelfth-century mind as Bouchard would like to believe.
True contradictions are something quite different from the evidence Bouchard
cites. Statements like "it is raining outside" and "it is not raining outside" are
contradictions. The truth of one necessarily entails the falsehood of the other. No
intellectual discourse could be sustained on maintaining two contradictory statements as
true at the same time, for such is the thinking of the schizophrenic. When this
equivocation of contradiction with contrary is resolved properly, Bouchard's thesis
becomes much less revolutionary than it might first seem, since all she can do is explain
that thinkers of the period worked to resolve intellectual conflicts dialectically just as
philosophers had been doing since the time of Plato and Aristotle, a claim no one would
oppose. While sources like Sic et Non or Gratian's Decretum provide her with a vast
array of collections of conflicting claims, Gratian attempted to resolve these conflicts
within canon law so that the canon lawyers had sensible guidelines with which to work,
while Abelard indicates that though two sources may seem contradictory, the sense in
which they are true may differ, rendering them not contradictory per se, but she fails to
account for many of Abelard's instructions in the prologue of the Sic et Non.
While changes in historical methodology have shifted focus away from
intellectual history, Luscombe and Bouchard reveal a perhaps deeper problem. Much of
Luscombe's book is a catalog of various copies of Abelard's writings according to their
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likely dates of copy and Bouchard's argument is based on an improper definition of some
of her terminology followed by a creative use of evidence. Due to the increasing
specialization of all academic disciplines, intellectual history becomes difficult to write
without merely summarizing arguments and texts or making glaring errors in
interpretation. A proper appraisal of Abelard requires an understanding of his arguments
that is hard to grasp without a deep knowledge of theology and logic. Even specialists on
these subjects disagree on relatively minor points in Abelard's writings, and many
secondary sources are impenetrable by any but the most specialized reader. This conflict
can be observed in biographies of Abelard in which some authors mainly consider the
historical details of his life while others attempt to connect his thought to his experiences.
Occasionally Abelard's various biographers reveal more about their own times and their
audience than they do about Abelard.
One of the earliest twentieth-century biographies of Abelard was Joseph
McCabe's. McCabe possessed advantages that many other Abelard scholars did not in
that he had been a priest, but his departure from the Church left him hostile to nearly
everything about it. 31 McCabe obviously sees Abelard as much like himself, someone
who had led both the secular and religious life, but McCabe also possessed Abelard's
persecution complex which led him to attack the Church through inaccurate
interpretations of Abelard. Early in the work McCabe labels Abelard a conceptualist and
claims Abelard's view of universals and particulars is only different in form from that of
later medieval intellectuals. 32 Such views continued to be assumed as fact even today,
since so little effort is applied to understanding the problem of universals from its
31 Joseph McCabe, Peter Abelard (New York: Burt Franklin, 1901), v.
32 Ibid., 29.
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twelfth-century or philosophical context, and having been a priest McCabe always
seemed a great authority on the Church's philosophy. McCabe also erroneously claims
Abelard compiled the Sic et Non primarily to emphasize the lack of agreement among the
patristic thinkers and thus destroy the credibility of their authority. 33 McCabe's biases
call his arguments into question, and his biography also offers little more material than
the Historia Calamitatum. Even so, as early as 1901 a scholar with first-hand knowledge
of life in the Church had labeled Abelard as a free thinking conceptualist who wished to
undermine ecclesiastical authority, a view which is still occasionally advocated today.
J.G. Sikes later published a mostly intellectual biography of Abelard in 1932.
Sikes attempted to explain the events of Abelard's life in the context of his intellectual
career, and produced one of a handful of biographies that took Abelard seriously as a
thinker rather than as the center of scandal. For many years to come, Sikes's work was
the only one which dealt primarily with Abelard's thought in such a comprehensive and
complete way that an educated audience could understand something of Abelard's
contributions to logic, theology, and ethics. While Sikes did understand that Abelard's
logical training greatly shaped his views oflater subjects and that much of his theological
writing must be viewed in the context of twelfth-century heresy, he placed a bit too much
emphasis on the intellectual heretics of Abelard's day.34 According to Sikes, Abelard
wrote mostly in response to the heresies of twelfth-century dialecticians like Berenger of
Tours and Roscelin, though he did acknowledge that less erudite heretics like Tanchelm
of Antwerp held some influence on Abelard's ideas, if only as a part of the greater
context of heretical thinking in twelfth-century France. While Abelard did dedicate time
33 Ibid., 146.
34 J.G. Sikes, Peter Abailard (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965),248.
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to refuting the trideism of his master Roscelin, he also quarreled with all his teachers and
primarily meant to defend the use of logic in theology by refuting his former master's
logic-based heresy. Despite these shortcomings, Sikes did produce a serious guide to
Abelard's thought without wallowing in the more fantastic events of his life.
Leif Grane wrote a fairly standard review of Abelard's autobiography, but unlike
his predecessors he interprets Abelard according to Haskins's thesis of the twelfthcentury renaissance. Grane's biography is short and clearly intended for a broad
audience, as it lacks the depth of a more serious work. He views Abelard as a prominent
figure of the twelfth-century renaissance who interpreted religious truth from the
perspective of a classical humanist and thus initiated the medieval questioning of
authority.35 The claim that Abelard was a religious skeptic is widely held but incorrect,
and the classical humanist label is anachronistic. Abelard did not differ much from his
contemporaries in his regard for classical learning, for learning the Roman classics was
instrumental in acquiring fluency in Latin and mastering rhetorical style. Grane's view
that Abelard was a prime example of a milieu has merit, but his claims rest too much on
Haskins's thesis, which may have created a new term at its inception, but has lost much
of its original influence.
Michael Clanchy has written the most recent biography of Abelard in which he
blends several methodologies of contemporary history to explain the context of the
twelfth century through a specific focus on Abelard. Clanchy initiates his work with a bit
of a hyperbole, claiming that "Peter Abelard, now forgotten, was once the most famous

35 Lei[ Grane, Peter Abelard: Philosophy and Christianity in the Middle Ages trans. Frederick and
Christine Crowley (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1964), 162.
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man in the world.,,36 Abelard certainly believed himself to be the most famous man in the
world, and while he is not as well known as other medieval personalities in the popular
psyche, he is still today the subject of a vast amount of specialized academic writing.
Clanchy's biography is nonetheless incredibly ambitious, covering every facet of
Abelard's life. By dedicating each chapter in the book to one of Abelard's roles, Clanchy
hopes to explain the twelfth century at large, since Abelard at one point or another in his
life donned so many of the masks that a twelfth-century man might wear: master, monk,
lover, and heretic. 37 Clanchy should have, however, brushed up on his logic before
attempting such a work. The study of logic exerted a powerful influence on Abelard's
worldview, but Clanchy misunderstands many of Abelard's terms and never connects one
branch of Abelard's intellectual work to another. He additionally sometimes becomes
mired in digressions due to his desire to use Abelard as a looking glass for the entire
twelfth century.
Though each of these biographers focused specifically on Abelard, others have
attempted to consider Abelard and Heloise together. More recent scholars are apt to
consider the influence of Heloise on Abelard due to the advance of feminist historical
interpretations, but considering Heloise apart from Abelard has proven notoriously
difficult due to the lack of documents. Though the titles of these works suggest they
consider both Abelard and Heloise equally, they in fact treat her as little more than an
ancillary character in Abelard's drama.
These dual biographies sometimes follow the standard biographical conventions,
but treat Heloise and Abelard as a single research subject. Etienne Gilson composed one
36 Clanchy, Abelard, 1.
37 Ibid., 19.
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the first of these biographies according to what he believed the thoughts and emotions of
Abelard and Heloise were within the context of their philosophic ideas and the events of
their lives. 38 Gilson was a historian of philosophy and is sometimes classified as a NeoThomist, though he often differed from the views of that movement markedly. Gilson's
work focuses primarily on the relationship between the lovers, though he does provide
some philosophical analysis as well. D.W. Robertson considered Abelard much as
previous scholars had: "Abelard is thought of as a rebel, a radical innovator, one of those
few men whose insights enable them to open up new perspectives to be exploited
fruitfully in the future."39 Even before Robertson published, scholars like Luscombe
began to question just how original and influential Abelard had been, but Robertson's
work presents other problems as well. Robertson does not write much on the historical
Heloise, preferring to focus on how Heloise has been viewed as a lover by the poets of
various periods of history. He also makes a claim supported nowhere else in the
historiography: the Historia Calamitatum and the letters between Abelard and Heloise
were meant to be an exemplum for the nuns at the Paraclete, and have been misinterpreted
by scholars ever since. 40 Though this argument is far outside the mainstream of Abelard
scholarship, Robertson claims that it is obvious to anyone who understands twelfthcentury religious writing. He fails to provide any explanation as to why, if it is so
obvious, other historians have failed to endorse his view.
A more serious work is Constant Mews's Abelard and Heloise, which is
essentially an update of Sikes's intellectual history of Abelard. Mews has largely made

38 Etienne Gilson, Heloise and Abelard (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), v.
39 D. W. Robertson, Jr., Abelard and Heloise (New York: Dial Press, 1972), xi.
40 Ibid., 118.

21

the study of Abelard his academic career since his days as a graduate student studying
under the likes of Luscombe and John Marenbon. His book is misleadingly titled, for he
writes little on Heloise herself, who again must be rendered as only a support character to
Abelard's drama. Mews claims "that the evolution of Abelard's thinking about language,
theology, and ethics is marked by continuity rather than by rupture and that it cannot be
understood apart from the influence of Heloise, whose intellectual achievement is much
more difficult to identify within the documentary record."41 The first argument of his
thesis is sound, and it would be erroneous to claim that Abelard's training and work in
logic did not influence his subsequent intellectual endeavors, but his second claim is
notoriously difficult to explain for the very reason he identifies. Part of the attraction
between Heloise and Abelard lay in their intellectual work-Abelard explicitly mentions
this in his autobiography as he explains his seduction of her-but discovering to what
extent Heloise may have influenced Abelard's scholarly development is impossible given
the nature and number of sources from Heloise herself.
The most recent of the biographies of Heloise and Abelard as a pair is James
Burge's Heloise and Abelard: A New Biography, a work targeting a popular audience that
unfortunately has little scholarly merit and is predicated on a number of misconceptions.
Though nearly all scholars who undertake any study of Abelard write about the affair,
Burge focuses on it with the rapacity of a tabloid publisher whose writing reeks of
pseudo-intellectual Freudian language: "In the totality of letters, early and late, we meet
Abelard and Heloise as people: we know about their most intimate terms of endearment;
we even know about the passion of their lovemaking, of the frantic, stolen moments in

41 Constant 1. Mews, Abelard and Heloise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),5.
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churches, of inventive sessions and erotic role-play."42 Though Burge reflects the popular
obsession with sex that dominates popular culture, few historians would likely be
surprised that medieval people did in fact have romantic relationships. Such
disproportionate attention to the affair detracts from the other areas of importance of
Abelard's life, particularly his intellectual work, which is seen as boring in comparison.
Nonetheless, Abelard is rare among his contemporaries and medieval intellectuals
in general for having had such a disastrous relationship, and perhaps Burge could be
forgiven for basing an obviously commercial venture on a topic quite likely to sell books.
He cannot, however, be forgiven for misrepresenting facts, especially when he could have
availed himself of so many quality secondary works. He refers to Abelard's Apologia
contra Bernardum as "misleadingly titled. ,,43 Though a popular audience is unlikely to

know much if any Latin, Burge could have cited a translation showing that the Apologia
is not misleadingly titled at all, for in this context apologia means "defense" rather than
"apology." While Abelard's life was as dramatic as any film, when it is presented in this
way the only result is incorrect understanding, because the people and events have been
divorced from their context in favor of simple answers.
Any historiography of studies of Abelard must consider not just history and
biography, but also the writings of philosophers for whom Abelard is obviously an
important figure. Unfortunately, much of the philosophic writing on Abelard attempts to
paint him as a realist, nominalist, or conceptualist, usually according to the prejudices of
the author. Anglophone philosophers typically classify Abelard as a nominalist.
Nominalism is much closer philosophically to the analytic linguistic philosophy of the
42 James Burge, Heloise and Abelard: A New Biography (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 7.
43 Ibid., 262.
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Anglophone world than realism, which compares favorably to continental European
philosophy. Neo-Thomists who are inimical to anti-metaphysical Anglophone
philosophy are more likely to classify Abelard as a conceptualist or moderate realist who
acted as a precursor to Aquinas and his moderate realism, thereby preserving continuity
within the medieval philosophic tradition. Abelard's own arguments are ambiguous
enough that he can be interpreted as falling within any of these camps, but these labels
were invented long after the twelfth century and are not useful in classifying his thought
historically. Philosophers analyze arguments on the basis of the arguments' validity or
invalidity rather than according to historical context, for too much focus on a
philosopher's private life can lead to fallacious arguments of motive. Too little concern
for historical context, however, has led to needless bickering over a small number of
Abelard's arguments. The lack of complete translations of Abelard's extant corpus means
that once these arguments become established, they become the context according to
which any of Abelard's arguments is analyzed and are thus difficult to refute without
recourse to accessible primary documents in translation.
John Boler lends credence to Abelard being a conceptualist through explaining the
implications of some of Abelard's ambiguity on what he calls the status of a thing. While
status was one of the technical terms Abelard coined in his argument on universals, he
never specifies what a status is. Abelard is clear that the status is not a thing and
therefore does not fit the definition for a universal, but he says it does allow the human
mind to classify several individuals into a distinct category such as genus or species.
This capacity of the status, according to Abelard, led the realists to mistake it for a
universal. Yet Abelard does not claim what the status is ifnot a universal. Boler does not
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believe he classified it as a word nor that Abelard believed a status could be predicated of
a thing. This leads to a problem, since Abelard's solution cannot be metaphysical since it
does not explain the existence of a universal thing nor logical since the argument does not
treat the status as a word which can be predicated. Boler thus argues that Abelard's
solution is essentially psychological, as the status is a mental image abstracted from a
thing by the understanding. 44 While he does not explicitly call Abelard's argument
conceptualist, by embracing a psychological interpretation he implies exactly this.
Frederick Copleston, an English Jesuit priest, wrote a history of philosophy from
the ancient world to the twentieth century for seminary students. As a work written by a
Catholic priest to educate Catholic seminarians, it includes an entire volume on medieval
philosophy as well as a heavy bias in favor of the Church. Copleston did not dedicate an
entire chapter to Abelard, though he writes multiple entries for Aquinas and Augustine.
He deals with Abelard thematically, mostly addressing the problem of universals and
particulars. Though Copleston was British, as a Jesuit priest and a Neo-Thomist he
dissents from the typical British view of Abelard as a nominalist and instead claims he
was a forerunner to Aquinas's moderate realism. 45 In this way Copleston preserves
continuity within scholasticism and claims it as a distinct period in the history of
philosophy rather than interpreting it as a method used by medieval philosophers.
Many of the interpretations of Abelard's logical arguments have been written in
the second half of the twentieth century by British philosophers who insist contra
Copleston that Abelard was a nominalist. They also frequently link Abelard's
44 John F. Boler, "Abailard and the Problem of Universals," Journal of the History ofPhilosophy I, no. I
(October 1963): 50-51.
45 Frederick Copleston, Medieval Philosophy. Augustine to Scotus, vol. 2 of A History ofPhilosophy (New
York: Double Day, 1950), 151-153.
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nominalism to discoveries in logic and set theory supposedly first made in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Martin Tweedale in Abailard on Universals
provides several extended excerpts of Abelard's logical writings in the original Latin with
facing English translations. Tweedale hopes these excerpts with his accompanying
argument will demonstrate that Abelard constructed a philosophic foundation for logic. 46
Though Tweedale dedicates most of the book to explaining Abelard's arguments, the
sixth chapter compares Abelard's rejection of universals as individual things to Gottlob
Frege's set theory. John Marenbon, another extensive researcher of Abelard's life and
thought, wished to overturn the previous view that Abelard was mostly a critic who did
not offer arguments of his own. Marenbon argues that Abelard was more than a critic but
acknowledges that Abelard did attack realist arguments, though he did not systematically
arrange his thought. 47 Jeffrey Brower, like Tweedale, connects Abelard's thought to more
recent logical theories. He claims Abelard as a nominalist due to what he perceives as
Abelard's preference for individual entities over universal types. 48 Each of these
arguments displays the linguistic Anglophone philosophy which emerged in the second
half of the twentieth century and was essentially nominalist.
Other philosophers give more consideration to Abelard's ethics. Neither
philosophers nor theologians grant much consideration to Abelard's theology, but
philosophy does still grant a special place to his ethics. Abelard differed from many of
his predecessors on the subject by analyzing ethics from the basis of intention. Many
subsequent commentators have thus labeled Abelard's ethics "intentionalist," claiming
46 Martin M. Tweedale, Abailard on Universals (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1976), ix.
47 John Marenbon, The Philosophy 0/Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),2.
48 Jeffrey E. Brower, "Abelard's Theory of Relations: Reductionism and the Aristotelian Tradition," The
Review a/Metaphysics 51, no. 3 (March 1998): 607.
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that Abelard argues the intention alone renders an action good or bad. John Porter
instead sees Abelard's ethics as not simply intentionalist, but also based on the concept of
consent to the contempt of God's will. 49 Intentionalist ethics can be entirely subjective;
the ethical agent only acts badly if he intends to do harm. Porter instead believes
Abelard's ethics has an objective basis, as God's will must be objective and immutable.
Though some of Abelard's biographers have attempted to place more emphasis on
Heloise, feminist historians have gone further in focusing on her exclusively. The only
extant documents by Heloise are her letters to Abelard, and so focusing on her to his
exclusion seems a difficult task. Drawing any conclusion about twelfth-century women
based on Heloise's life is also problematic. Heloise did not lead any more typical a life
than Abelard did, and while Abelard played many roles in his life that might be
commonly observed among the twelfth-century populace, Heloise, due to her level of
education and her eventual position of leadership at the convent Paraclete, was especially
atypical for a twelfth-century woman. Despite her elite position, feminist historians and
philosophers continue to rewrite the dominant narrative of Heloise.
Andrea N ye argues that Heloise should be considered a philosopher in her own
right, but because her style and form are essentially feminine, the male-controlled
philosophic canon excludes her. Men who have dominated the philosophic landscape
since the pre-socratics see philosophy as logical and dialectical while Heloise writes from
an emotional perspective and her writings have thus been dismissed as hysterical raving. 50
Nye ignores a number of secondary historical sources which heavily criticize Abelard for
49 John Porter, "Responsibility, Passion, and Sin: A Reassessment of Abelard's Ethics," The Journal of
Religious Ethics 28 no. 3 (Fall 2000): 392-393.
50 Andrea Nye, "A Woman's Thought or a Man's Discipline? The Letters of Abelard and Heloise,"
Hypatia 7, no. 3 (Summer, 1992): 16.
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responding to Heloise's passionate entreaties so coldly, including Mews who claimed that
Heloise influenced Abelard as much as he influenced her. While Heloise does make
philosophic arguments to Abelard in her letters, these do not represent a cohesive
philosophic worldview. Heloise focuses exclusively on her own situation, but makes no
argument as to anything universally true for humanity or even for women based on her
own experience. IfNye's argument for Heloise were universalized, no claim could ever
be excluded from philosophy on the basis that its exclusion would somehow injure a
certain group of people or limit human knowledge. Though this erosion of standards has
largely come to pass, if it were ever fully imposed the resultant relativist fallacy would
prevent philosophy from even establishing and defending its own existence as a
discipline.
Shulamith Shahar makes a less dismissive argument surmised in the title of her
work, The Fourth Estate. She claims women in the middle ages must be understood as a
distinct class in society, because unlike men they formed a distinct subcategory in the
traditional tripartite division of medieval society into nobility, clergy, and peasantry.51
According to Shahar, Heloise's arguments differ from those of Abelard precisely because
she was not simply an abbot like him, but also a woman, which led her to have much
different views. She particularly focuses on Heloise's view of marriage. Heloise
denounced marriage, because it renders the realationship contractual rather than free.
This is part of the basis of courtly love; the characters in the story love each other outside
of marriage so that their emotions remain free rather than legally or religiously defined.
This reflects women's disenchantment with being pawns in political marriages that were
51 Shulamith Shahar, The Fourth Estate: A History of Women in the Middle Ages. trans. Chaya Galai
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 12.
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not based on love. 52 Though Shahar devotes attention to Heloise herself rather than her
position as Abelard's lover, she makes her into a representative of an ideal type rather
than an individual. The explication of this ideal type is, of course, Shahar's task, and
doing so does describe the gender-based historical context in which Heloise lived, but it
does not recreate Heloise as an individual. The lack of significant evidence about her life
outside of her letters to Abelard may make any such reconstruction unfortunately
impossible.
Most of these scholars have produced valuable sources for any concerted study of
Abelard, while a relative few have focused attention on issues sure to gamer attention but
not improve the understanding of him. To borrow from John of Salisbury, every historian
and philosopher "to make a name for himself, coins his own special error."53 The major
shortcomings of these studies can be divided into several categories. Some are written
from a broad perspective in which Abelard becomes only a piece of evidence. Others are,
as per the usual requirements of academia, so narrowly focused and technical they are
impenetrable to all but the most specialized of specialists. All of them somehow consider
Abelard a remarkable figure in some way. While Abelard certainly led an atypical life
and is unique among medieval intellectuals in that so much of his personal writing and
primary documents written about his life survive, scholars should be on guard against the
temptation either to grant Abelard a disproportionate amount of attention due to the
availability of scandalous evidence or to eliminate Abelard's individuality to make him a
mere representative of a larger grand narrative on a twelfth-century "renaissance."

52 Ibid., 76.
53 John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, trans. Mrujorie Chibnall (London: Thomas Nelson and Son,
1956),117.
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--------

Understanding Abelard as an academic requires a thorough reading of his texts and a
consideration of the context in which he wrote them. Understanding him as a man
requires a review of his autobiography along with those secondary sources which address
the areas of his life on which Abelard chose to remain silent.
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INTRODUCTION

Though concern for Abelard's intellectual work is usually confined to specialists
in philosophy, the details of his personal life are better documented than any other
medieval philosopher and often receive considerable attention due to their dramatic
nature. While understanding his private life is key to understanding Abelard, the
scandalous details of his life not only receive more attention than is warranted, they also
lead to the conclusions that Abelard stands among those larger than life individuals who
show that the twelfth century was a "renaissance" and that he was a truly original and
special figure. Despite the tragedy of Abelard's life and his superhuman arrogance, he
was not a Nietzschean superman but rather a man of his times who left behind some
interesting personal documents including an autobiography and many letters. Much of
the private lives of other medieval philosophers is shrouded in mystery, since they
concentrated so much more on their work than self-defense.
Much of the information of Abelard's life comes from his autobiography, the
Historia Calami/atum, or The Story of My Misfortunes. Figures in the preceding
centuries had not produced autobiographies as Abelard had. While the literate of
previous centuries had not continued the practice of writing about themselves, twelfthcentury authors were beginning to rediscover the genre, but they usually directed it
heavily toward religion. Abelard discusses religious themes in his book, but he connects
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everything to the events and people in his life as individuals rather than the archetypal
figures often found in other hagiographies. 54
Abelard composed the Historia Calamitatum after leaving the monastery of St.
Gildas de Rhuys in Brittany.55 In the book, Abelard focuses on his miseries, rendering it,
as all autobiographies are, an inherently biased source. 56 The fact that Abelard is so
careful to name real people but then to engage in biased reporting indicates that he may
have intented the document to announce his return to teach in Paris. A Parisian audience
would have been familiar with many of the adversaries Abelard mentions. He had
certainly made many enemies in his life, and it would have served him to denounce them
prior to his arrival. 57
Though he gives no precise date for any event, Abelard is at least clear when
referring to places. He was born in Le Pallet in Brittany, an area renowned for producing
witty clerics. 58 He mentions little of his early life or family relations except to say that
his father was a knight who valued education and ensured that his sons had access to it. 59
Abelard so took to intellectual endeavors that he gave up his right of primogeniture as the
eldest son and "fled utterly from the court of Mars that I might win learning in the bosom
ofMinerva.,,60 Though he may have renounced his inheritance, Abelard never gave up
the outlook of a militant twelfth-century knight. He repeatedly uses martial language in
describing his conflicts throughout his life. Achieving success in Paris required him to

54 Clanchy,Abelard, 124.
55 Mary M. McLaughlin, "Abelard as Autobiographer: The Motives and Meaning of his 'Story of
Calamities,'" Speculum 42, no. 3 (July 1967): 464.
56 Clanchy,Abelard, 67.
57 McCabe, Peter Abelard, 223.
58 Clanchy,Abelard, 29.
59 Ibid., 135-136.
60 Bellows, The Story of My Misfortunes, I; Grane, Peter Abelard, 35.
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form alliances and take political sides at court in a dance not far removed from actual
warfare. 6l He also never lost the contentious nature of a warrior eager for battle, for he
quarreled with many of his academic superiors.
Abelard explains that of all the academic disciplines he gravitated most easily to
logic, which in the twelfth century was equated with dialectic from the trivium of the
liberal arts. As did many students of the day, he traveled throughout France following an
itinerant master, though he never specifies who this instructor was. 62 This master was
none other than Roscelin of Compiegne, a well known but controversial master of
dialectic who, in a treatise on the Trinity, denied the unity of the Persons. The Church
would have declared Roscelin a heretic for this teaching had he not recanted. 63
Announcing himself as the pupil of such a controversial figure would have won Abelard
undue negative attention upon his reentry of Paris. While he continually took pains to
dissociate himself from his first teacher and makes no specific mention of Roscelin
within the Historia Calamitatum, Abelard never falsely denied being Roscelin's student. 64
Education in earlier periods of medieval Europe occurred mainly within the
monastic schools, but by the twelfth century the cathedral schools had begun to replace
them as centers of learning. Northern France possessed prolific numbers of cathedral
schools. Those of Rheims and Laon focused on dialectic, but it was Paris that would
become preeminent in the academic culture of France and eventually the site of the first
university north of the Alps.6s Abelard arrived in this academically exciting environment
in his early twenties, but he had foresight enough to be secretive about his early education
61 Clanchy, Abelard, 130.
62 Bellows, The Story of My Misfortunes, 2.
63 Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 21-22.
64 Grane, Peter Abelard, 36.
65 Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, 48-49.
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under Roscelin. 66 A negative reputation as a student of a heretic would have ended a
scholarly career prematurely; an enthusiastic student and supporter of Roscelin certainly
would have faced insurmountable difficulties gaining the approval of Abelard's desired
Parisian instructor, William of Champeaux, who held philosophic ideas opposed to those
of Roscelin.
Abelard attributes great intellectual ability to William, but confesses that he
earned William's enmity by attacking his philosophic positions. 67 Unamused by his
young pupil's precocious arguments, William became Abelard's first enemy in both
academic and state politics. Having alienated William and gained a following among the
students, Abelard recounts that he decided to found his own school at "none other than
the castle of Melun, at the time a royal seat."68 Abelard later moved his seat of
instruction from Melun to Corbeil, after which he records that he ceased to teach and
returned to Brittany due to illness brought on by excessive study. After his recovery he
returned to Paris to again study under William who had become the bishop ofChalons. 69
Without hesitation Abelard continued to attack William's philosophy.
Eventually many of Abelard's fellow students began to believe he was much
brighter than William, and they forsook the veteran for the upstart. 70 Though Abelard
attempted to set up schools at Paris and Melun, he could not completely evade William's
influence, and finally settled on Mont Ste. Genevieve. The Mont allowed Abelard to
maintain a position near Paris, but it already held a reputation as a home for unorthodox
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thinkers. Roscelin himself had taught there before he began wandering through France. 71
Abelard had truly become a master, and despite William's continued attempts at
interference, his position remained safe.
Since theology and philosophy were so closely linked in the middle ages, it would
have been unfitting for Abelard to continue to study one while remaining ignorant of the
other. His knowledge of logic could assure many students would seek him for
instruction, but with an understanding of issues more critical to the Church he could
improve his image by mastering another subject. A more thorough knowledge of
theological argument and scripture could also prevent a scholar from falling into the trap
of heresy. 72 Abelard writes that Anselm of Laon had long been considered preeminent
within the field of theology, and so he began attending his classes. 73 As a speculative
thinker fond of argument, Abelard could not find Anselm of Laon, who taught through
glossing scripture rather than through debate which Abelard craved, an inspiring
instructor. 74 Abelard soon fought with Anselm just as he had with William, and this battle
held political as well as academic implications.
After ceasing to attend Anselm's lectures, some of Anselm's other students
challenged Abelard to deliver a public lecture on a notoriously difficult to interpret
passage from Ezekiel using only dialectic. Most believed Abelard would fail miserably,
and so few attended the first lecture. Those in attendance were amazed with their
classmate's ability, and word soon spread of Abelard's lecturing skill. 75 Having again
triumphed intellectually, Abelard returned to Paris, where he became a canon of Sens, to
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teach, but here he would initiate the sequence of events that began the great struggles of
his life. 76
Having triumphed in all his intellectual battles, Abelard began to grow bored and
arrogant. He writes that he believed himself to be "the only philosopher remaining in the
whole world"77 and now sought to add sexual conquest to his growing list of
accomplishments. The target of Abelard's advances would be "Heloise, the niece of a
canon who was called Fulbert."78 The affair between Heloise and Abelard would assure
their place in history, for imagination is often drawn to exceptions and oddities. The
inherent drama of the lovers' story has sometimes secured an interest among historians
and philosophers for Abelard.
To ensure his successful seduction, Abelard appealed to Fulbert's greed. Though
he desired a tutor for Heloise, he did not wish to splurge on the cost of private instruction.
Abelard told Fulbert that he would teach the woman and pay a nominal fee in return for
room and board, as care for a household distracted him from his studies and was
becoming too expensive for him to pay.79 Fulbert assented to the arrangement believing
he had purchased the services of one of the most famous teachers in France. As the affair
and its concealment came to dominate Abelard's time and energy, he began to neglect his
academic work. Rather than continuing his studies of logic and theology, he
complacently reused old lecture material in his classes and focused on writing love letters
and poems for Heloise. 80 Many people in Paris knew of the affair; only Fulbert remained
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ignorant of what was transpiring in his own home. 8' After finally catching the lovers in
the act, Fulbert promptly expelled the cleric from his house.
As a woman, Heloise possessed no right to conduct such a liaison, for it was a
dishonor to Fulbert who, as a man, could seek vengeance on Abelard. Abelard sensibly
wished to avoid any violence Fulbert might visit upon him. The obvious option for
rendering sexual relations legitimate was marriage, but Abelard wished the marriage to be
kept a secret, a stipulation to which Fulbert agreed. 82 Heloise, though unabashed of her
relationship with Abelard, had no wish to marry him. Heloise believed a marriage would
detract from Abelard's calling as a philosopher. 83
Heloise was no fool. She knew that a marriage would endanger Abelard's career.
Marriage publicly communicated the sexual nature of husband and wife. Though no
specific canon law forbade marriage among secular clerics provided they had not taken
the vow of celibacy, advancement within the academic hierarchy often led to such vows,
especially for teachers of theology. 84 Abelard desired a secret marriage to avert Fulbert's
wrath while preserving his position at Notre Dame. Had the marriage been a matter of
public record, the Church may have required him to resign his position so that a
preferable candidate could fill the prestigious appointment. Fully aware that a marriage
would jeopardize her lover's career, Heloise felt marriage was a selfish act that would
preserve her honor but end the contributions of a brilliant philosopher.
Fulbert agreed to Abelard's plan for a secret marriage but soon began to abuse
Heloise for having the affair and damaging his honor. 85 Abelard abducted her from her
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uncle's home and sent her back to Argenteuil, where he had the nuns assemble a habit
without a veil for her. 86 Fulbert became incensed, believing Abelard intended to dissolve
the marriage, and so began to plot his revenge. While Abelard was asleep in his room at
Notre Dame, Fulbert's hired thugs broke in through the aid of one of Abelard's servants
whom they had bribed and then castrated Abelard. 87 Wounded and humiliated, Abelard
became a monk at the monastery of St. Denis, and bade Heloise to become a nun at
Argenteuil. 88 Despite his public shame and entrance into the cloister, Abelard did not
reform his combativeness nor relinquish philosophy.
In some ways Abelard's academic activity was enhanced by entering St. Denis.
He now had access to the monastery library and the scriptorium. During his years at
Melun, Corbeil, and Notre Dame Abelard had focused on logic. Though his castration
and entrance into the religious life did not suppress his combativeness, it did provide him
with a new topic upon which to focus his energies as well as the sources needed for such
pursuits. As a monk, Abelard would apply his thought on logic to theology.
Yet when Abelard originally entered St. Denis, he did not initially continue his
teaching. He seems genuinely to have wished to live the contemplative monastic life of
solitude and reflection, but he continued his combative ways by constantly complaining
of the worldliness of the monks ofSt. Denis. Abelard may have entered the monastery
with less than noble motives, but he soon came to the desire to reform himself.89 The
throngs of students, however, had no intention of leaving Abelard to his contemplation,
nor did the monastery wish to relinquish the fees Abelard received for his services. 90
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At the behest of his students, Abelard composed a work of theology on the
Trinity.91 He titled the work simply Theologia, but it is distinguished from several other
of Abelard's works by its first words: "Summi Boni." Abelard through his criticism of
Anselm of Laon had made enemies of two of the master's students, Alberic ofRheims
and Lotulf of Novara. Abelard presents his adversaries' motivations as an expression of
jealousy of his intellectual superiority.92 The two were well enough connected in the
Church that they managed to summon Abelard to the council of Soissons after claiming
his Theologia expressed heretical views. Cono of Palestrina, the papal legate to France,
found Abelard's theology to be heretical and sentenced him to cast his own book into the
flames in addition to confinement at the abbey of St. Medard, a monastery dedicated to
reforming wayward monks. 93 Cono soon overturned his own sentence due the hostility he
aroused by levying it and allowed Abelard to return to St. Denis after but a brief
internment. 94
Abelard's trial had taught him the importance of authority and research to
support his arguments; he would not as before rely simply on his skill in dialectic. In his
investigations in the St. Denis library, Abelard discovered Bede's History of the Apostles
in which Bede claims the monastery of St. Denis had not been founded by Dionysius the
Areopagite. Abelard rather foolishly chose to share his research with his brothers, again
angering them, though he claims he meant only to joke. 95 While the modern mind may
find the monks'anger unfounded, Abelard had, whatever he intended, gravely insulted
them. Dionysius the Areopagite had been a convert of none other than St. Paul, had been
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a bishop, and had, according to medieval tradition, written a mystical philosophic treatise
which scholars now know was merely signed under the pseudonym Dionysius. The
monastery of St. Denis was the royal monastery of France and St. Denis one of the
kingdom's patron saint. For Abelard to jestingly suggest that the famous Dionysius the
Areopagite had no connection to the monastery, even with the backing of the Venerable
Bede, was quite foolish. Having again made himself unwelcome among his brethren,
Abelard would again leave the monastery, though after his heresy trial he would now
need further support to do so.
Abelard did not have the authority to leave St. Denis as he had in the past. Not
only had Abelard become suspect after Soissons, but Abbot Adam also feared Abelard
might enter another monastery. Abelard gained the intersession of Count Theobald of
Champagne, but Adam still would not allow him to leave and further sully the
monastery's reputation. After Adam died, his successor Suger maintain this policy.
Abelard then turned to his old political patron, Stephen de Garlande, to appeal to King
Louis the Fat. With the threat of royal intervention, Suger agreed to a compromise which
allowed Abelard to withdraw from the monastery as a hermit so long as he remained
obedient to Suger rather than any other abbot. 96
Though he was safe from the other monks, Abelard did not endure solitude for
long. Students again sought his retreat, converting his initial hermitage into a larger
compound complete with cultivated fields worked by the students so that Abelard would
be free to teach. Abelard had dedicated his original oratory to the Trinity, but he
rededicated the expanded compound to the Paraclete, the Greek term for the Holy Spirit

96 Bellows, The Story of My Misfortunes, 49-51; McCabe, Peter Abelard, 180.

40

in John's Gospel with a particular emphasis on the Holy Spirit's role as comforter. 97
Abelard indeed felt comfort here, surrounded by his willing students rather than
disgruntled monks or envious adversaries. This point in Abelard's life would also prove
extremely intellectually fertile. Here he would continue developing his logic and revising
his earlier theological arguments.
Abelard's reputation continued to grow for the better, but the quiet life of a rural
academic was not to be for him. The abbot of the monastery of St. Gildas in Abelard's
native Brittany died in 1125, and the monks of the abbey elected Abelard to be their new
abbot. Under such circumstances, Suger could hardly deny Abelard's entrance there. 98
Though abbots held immense power in the twelfth-century Church hierarchy, Abelard
despised his new position. Born a knight and spending most of his life in France, Abelard
could not even speak the native Celtic of Brittany or understand the speech of the monks
under his charge. 99 He certainly had no desire to learn the native tongue and immediately
began annoying the monks at St. Gildas with his moralizing just as he did at St. Denise.
While Abelard attempted to shepherd his own wayward monks, Abbot Suger
continued his own agenda to aggrandize St. Denis. He discovered a forged land deed in
the monastery library that stated the land of Heloise's convent of Argenteuil actually
belonged to his monastery. Abelard and Heloise had never completely lost contact even
after they entered the religious life, but Heloise's eviction remade their relationship into
something official. Now a prioress, Heloise asked Abelard for help after she and her nuns
lost their convent. Abelard bequeathed the Paraclete to them, and Pope Innocent II
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confirmed the donation in 1131, making the Paraclete into an official convent. Abelard
now became a spiritual adviser to Heloise and the nuns, and his position as the convent's
male overseer allowed him frequently to leave St. Gildas for the Paraclete, providing him
with welcome relief from his own unruly monks. 100 The distance between St. Gildas in
the western portion of Brittany and the site of the Paraclete in Champagne is well over
three hundred fifty miles. The countryside at that time was infested with bandits and
robbers, thus making journeys between the two abbeys perilous as well as long. Abelard
came to spend increasing amounts of time abroad. Though long hours on the road saved
Abelard some frustration from administering his own monastery, the monks at St. Gildas
used the time to plot against him.
They eventually became angry enough over Abelard's continued moral sanctions
that, according to him, they began to plot to kill him. During one of his frequent trips to
the Paraclete, Abelard had sustained a significant injury after falling from his horse. He
claimed they attempted to poison him as he recuperated, though he may have exaggerated
to draw a parallel between himself and St. Benedict. 101 The lack of discipline eventually
became enough of an issue that Abelard sought to solve the problem by calling in the
papal legate and threatening the monks with excommunication.102 Despite their oaths to
Abelard and the pope, the monks of St. Gildas returned to their mischief, prompting
Abelard to flee the monastery to return to Paris and resume teaching. Abelard ended his
autobiography with his final attempt to restore order at St. Gildas and wrote nothing of
the final decade of his life, yet within that final decade he would contend with his greatest
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adversary.
Though the exact date of Abelard's return to Paris is unknown, he most likely
arrived during the early 1130s when Stephen de Garlande was again in political favor at
court and could assure Abelard a position. This time Abelard taught on Mont Ste
Genevieve, a personal territory of Stephen's, rather than at Notre Dame.103 He continued
to revise his Theologia in addition to composing a new work on ethics titled Scito te
Jpsum and the unfinished Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian. The
theological writings again led to Abelard's undoing. A revised copy of the Theologia
found its way to the Cistercian monastery of Signy where William of St. Thierry became
alarmed by its contents. He wrote a rebuttal to Abelard's arguments and mailed this
along with a letter informing Bernard of Clairvaux, a Cistercian abbot and foe of
Abelard's particular brand of philosophic inquiry, of the possibility of heresy within
Abelard's teaching. 104 As a zealous advocate of Gregorian reform, enemy of Stephen de
Garlande, and proponent of scriptural based argumentation, Bernard found much to
despise in Abelard, and the two men would remain bitter enemies nearly until Abelard's
death.
Though Abelard never specifically names Bernard in his autobiography, scholars
believe that when Abelard complained that his teaching at the Paraclete aroused suspicion
from "certain new apostles," one of whom "made it his boast that he had revived the true
monastic life,"105 he was referring to Bernard and perhaps to Norbert ofPremontre, an
associate of Bernard's whom Abelard regarded as a fraud. 106 Whatever mischief Norbert
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may have caused, Bernard proved the more implacable foe. Born to a Burgundian
aristocrat and a pious mother in 1090, Bernard and each of his five brothers and one sister
all entered the religious life. In 1112 Bernard entered Citeaux, the reformed Benedictine
monastery where the Cistercian movement originated. l07 Bernard took an interest in
Abelard after the Breton philosopher had revised the work for which he had been
condemned at Soissons, for he feared dialectic applied to theology placed reason above
the authority of the Church. 108 Though Bernard was a fierce proponent for spirituality
and orthodoxy, he held a number of political connections that also endangered Abelard's
position.
Stephen de Garlande often held important titles under King Louis VI, but the king
died on August 1, 1137. His successor, King Louis VII, chose to favor Suger of St. Denis
and Bernard over Stephen. Suger and Bernard hoped that their influence with the young
king would lead to a new era of reform within the Church in France. They worked to
isolate enemies of their reform agenda, including Stephen and his allies like Abelard.
The new king came to have antipathy for Abelard. 109
Bernard had already entered into ecclesiastical politics even before he gained
influence at court. In 1130, Pope Honorius II died and the election of his successor
produced a split within the Church. While a minority within the Conclave backed
Innocent II, the majority favored Peter Leonis who took the name Anacletus II. In the
resulting battle for supremacy between the two, Anacletus held sway in Rome and the
rest ofItaly while Innocent fled to France where King Louis, the French nobility, and
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Bernard rallied to his cause. Bernard believed his activity in ecclesiastical politics in
France was a sacred duty. When Anacletus died in early 1138, Innocent and Bernard
initiated a new wave of refonn and had no desire to return to the chaos of schism. 110
They would deal with any dissent swiftly to prevent the return of the upheaval they had
witnessed in the eight previous years.
Completely lacking an understanding of ecclesiastical politics and diplomatic
decorum, Abelard could not adapt to the new situation. Bernard, Suger, and Pope
Innocent considered Abelard's theological and philosophical questioning to be a criticism
of the political and religious order that they had recently restored. Fear motivated them
to prevent Abelard from continuing his inquiries and label him a heretic to silence him. III
Bernard secured pennission from the Bishop of Paris to preach publicly against
Abelard and made accusations of heresy against him to the pope. To avoid a second trial
for heresy, Abelard convinced the Archbishop of Sens to allow a meeting between
himself and Bernard in 1140. Abelard had hoped that by holding a council at Sens he
could confront Bernard as his accuser, thus allowing him to discredit Bernard as nothing
but a bully. Bernard was most displeased; he had no desire to confront as powerful a
debater as Abelard. Bernard therefore mailed letters to the pope to ensure the
condemnation of Abelard's claims concerning the power of the Persons of the Trinity, the
substance of the Holy Spirit, and the purpose of Christ's sacrifice. 112
Abelard's plans thus ruined, he appealed to Rome directly; however, Bernard sent
letters to the pope before Abelard even began his journey to the Curia. Innocent II then
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excommunicated Abelard in July of 1141. Beaten and broken, Abelard retreated to the
abbey of Cluny where his supporter Peter the Venerable was abbot. Peter, more gifted in
social grace than Abelard, negotiated a reconciliation between Abelard and the Church
and even with Bernard, thus securing the recension of his excommunication. By the
terms of the reconciliation, Abelard agreed to remain at Cluny and correct the parts of his
writing which had been deemed heretical, while Bernard agreed to cease denouncing him
in public. In old age and poor health, Abelard lived the last of his days in quiet
contemplation at Cluny. He died in 1142.113
Such a tumultuous life has earned Abelard much attention from scholars who have
often referred to him as the most original and most influential thinker of the twelfth
century. He is usually held to have anticipated such later developments in medieval
philosophy as moderate realism, intentionalist ethics, the quaestio as the centerpiece of
philosophic inquiry, and the dialectical resolution of conflicts in authoritative sources in
philosophic proofs. Though evidence of all of these may be found in Abelard's writings,
he was neither the first nor the only intellectual to employ them. Indeed, each was part of
the intellectual context of Abelard's day, and he used them just as all his own instructors
had. Though a brilliant contributor of many positive arguments rather than a mere critic,
Abelard was not the intellectual radical that his private life has often suggested. His
questions, the most important method in philosophy, were largely the same as those of his
contemporaries, while his answers became additional contributions to twelfth-century
intellectual life that found supporters but did not replace the alternatives.
Much of Abelard's method and terminology is consistent with the preexisting
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philosophic tradition and is often found in other disciplines such as law. It did not
originate with Abelard, but was rather part of the twelfth-century methodology of which
Abelard was only a participant. Whatever influence he could have exercised on future
generations was limited by his convictions for heresy and the rediscovery after his death
ofthe complete Aristotelian corpus which shifted philosophic inquiry in new directions.
When these inconvenient facts are ignored and Abelard's contributions can be compared
to those of the giants of the thirteenth century, he appears to be one of the greatest
intellectuals of all time, but such claims are sustained more by sentimental attachment to
his dramatic personal life than to the facts of his contributions. Abelard was not a highly
original nor influential philosopher. He was not the world's first professor. He was
rather a brilliant teacher who, through great skill and wit, attracted great crowds of
students to whom he taught what he believed to be certain, established truths rather than
innovative theses.
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UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS

Before to Abelard's intellectual career both in importance and chronology was
logic. All his later contributions to theology and ethics would be based on that initial
academic pursuit that gained him a reputation for brilliance, arrogance, and
contentiousness. The primary philosophical debate in the twelfth century was on the
problem of universals and particulars, which was concerned with individual things and
the logical categories into which they fit. The prevailing argument was called realism,
because it claimed the broad categories were not simply elements of the human
understanding or arbitrary schemata for the organization of sense data, but were
themselves real things. 1l4 By the time of Abelard's early life, scholars had begun to
question this thesis which Abelard himself would eventually himself reject.
To contribute anything to logic required a rigorous education not only in logic
itself, but also in grammar and rhetoric, the three together forming the trivium of the
seven liberal arts. The formal study of logic of the period was much more linguistic than
symbolic or mathematical, and students therefore needed a prior grounding in composing
sentences and arguments and the technical vocabulary that logic always generates. As
this area of study laid the foundation for Abelard's future intellectual pursuits, he used, as
a logician, what he believed were properly formed and worded arguments, while he
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applied logic to each future intellectual endeavor.
Abelard first achieved fame by besting his own teacher, William of Champeaux,
in a logical dispute during which Abelard claimed William's view that there is
numerically one human essence manifest in all people requires this one essence to be in
multiple locations at once. 115 He quickly earned a reputation for rebelliousness, wit,
intelligence, and pride that made him appealing to some but troublesome to others.
Prudent students usually silence their reservations with their instructors' arguments until
such time as they have achieved a level of mastery that allows the disagreement to be a
purely academic matter. Abelard would not wait to be admitted to the ranks of the
masters before attempting to destroy the realist position. Such impudence has in posterity
made Abelard's argument seem highly nuanced and original; however, the Peripatetic of
Pallet owed a great deal of his own views on logic to his teachers Roscelin and William
due to Abelard's use of insights from both his former instructors. While Abelard's
counter of realism seems to be a new course in twelfth-century logic, other logicians had
already begun to question the coherence of realism long before Abelard made himself
famous.
Realism itself possessed origins which were more revolutionary than have been
acknowledged. As the reform movement continued within the Church, the reformers
found a convenient philosophical bedrock in realism which allowed them to support
arguments on the Trinity and original sin. While Abelard's contributions to logic were a
necessary step in the narrative of the discipline, the twelfth century was not a time of
intellectual innovation so much as it was a time of collection, review, and resolution of
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conflicting arguments, and Abelard's contributions were very much consistent with this
context making him perhaps not so rebellious and novel as he might appear. His
tempestuous nature won him the admiration of many students, but it also earned him
critics and enemies, costing him the potential influence he may have had after his death.
Abelard's logical arguments should be see as a manifestation of the milieu in which he
lived rather than as a distinct discontinuity within the development of the western
intellectual tradition.
Though intellectual life had been largely dead in the West since the Dark Ages, it
began to revive by the eleventh century. Before Anselm of Bec composed his
philosophical monographs, the last and only philosopher of any repute prior to the 1000s
in Europe had been John Scotus Erigena, who translated Greek texts for King Charles the
Bald of France. 116 The Frankish empire constructed by Charlemagne still as yet exercised
a degree of centralized control over Europe despite having been broken into three parts.
In what was still a relatively orderly world, intellectual activity could continue to grow.

Erigena and other monks in Ireland were some of the few people in the West with any
knowledge of Greek, which allowed them to read philosophic texts that had never been
translated into Latin. The institution of feudalism, however, began to take its toll on
society. The Frankish kingdoms became hopelessly fragmented as the kings divided the
land into benefices, and the nobles fought private wars and feuds with each other. A
number of raiders poured from the North, South, and East, engulfing large sections of
Europe in war and uncertainty, two poor conditions for academic study. Even the Church
felt the lack of stability as the papacy became a political pawn which the Roman nobility
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and the German emperor fought to control.
The source material that intellectuals require to begin any inquiry had not yet
recovered to the position it held prior to the fall of Rome in the West. Very little of
ancient Greek philosophy aside form Plato's Timaeus and Aristotle's logical treatises
survived in Latin translation. Texts originally composed in Latin by Cicero or Seneca
survived in great numbers, but Roman philosophic writing often lacks the speculative
qualities of its ancient Greek predecessor. 117 Monks carefully examined what little they
possessed, preserving what they had rather than attempting to break new philosophic
ground as the world around them seemed to revert to the chaos from which the Franks
had not long ago rescued it.
The monks required a tool for their efforts to conserve their intellectual holdings.
What little investment in philosophy there was between the end of the Carolingian
Empire and the twelfth century applied the use of this tool, dialectic, to the problem of
universals, which became the prime philosophic concern after the return of stability in the
twelfth century.118 The method for sifting through the various authoritative sources on
canon law and theology was the philosopher's tool of dialectic, the last of the subjects of
the trivium. 119 Built upon the foundation of the previous study of rhetoric and grammar,
dialectic formed a linguistic analysis of what today is labeled "term logic.,,120 While any
academic pursuit requires some understanding of logic, often the student passively
absorbs it during the course of study. Rarely does the law or biology student exert an
effort to study logic itself, even though he often makes use of the tool. In the eleventh
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and twelfth centuries this situation was reversed; a student had to learn logic before
progressing toward what the educators of the day believed were more specialized studies.
Nevertheless, as a tool invented by the ancient Greek philosophers, dialectic had not yet
shaken its philosophic baggage. While students might learn dialectic to apply it to legal
study, they learned it through philosophic argumentation. Unfortunately teachers oflogic
did not possess a wide variety of texts. They were restricted to Latin translations of
Plato's Timaeus, which lacks much use of dialectic in comparison to Plato's other
dialogues, Aristotle's logical treatises called the "logica vetus," Porphyry's Isagoge, and
Boethius's commentaries on it. Many copies of these works had been made during the
previous centuries when philosophers were more isolated and more interested in
preserving knowledge than breaking new ground. 121
The Timaeus did not hold much interest for logicians, because it is really a work
on cosmology delivered mostly as a monologue. Without debate or conversation the
interplay of dialectic is not properly illustrated. The texts on logic, however, would
contribute much of the style and vocabulary of eleventh and twelfth-century logic. This
new enthusiasm for the study and application of logic sometimes produced eccentric
results. The Church required a legal justification for much of its reforming activities, but
ultimately the Church's power rested on scriptural authority. As the institution ordained
by God to save as many of the souls of the human race as possible, it also had to define
and codify its doctrine to prevent opponents from claiming it had not the power to act as
it now did. The experiment of combining dialectical analysis with ambiguous religious
doctrine sometimes produced results the Church found unacceptable.
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The neo-platonist Porphyry, in order to simplify some of Aristotle's teaching,
had written on the five predicables, the categories by which predicates are related to
subjects. Briefly, the five categories are genus, a collection of several species; species, a
collection of several individuals; difference, any essential characteristic which separates
two or more things; property, a capability or capacity of all things within a species; and

accident, which Porphyry says is that which "comes into being and passes away apart
from the destruction of the substratum."122 More properly, an accident is a characteristic
which does not define a thing essentially and may therefore change without altering what
the thing is. Accidents have importance, because they allow the human mind to detect
change. Though a change in accidents alone does not show a change in substance,
whenever a substance changes some the accidents will change.
By the eleventh century, the Church had begun to codify its teaching on
sacraments, but still had not yet reached the level of certainty it would possess years later.
On the subject of the Eucharist, the Church leaned toward transubstantiation, but had not
made official pronouncements, leaving some dialecticians to apply their art in hopes that
they could more properly elucidate religious truth. One such dialectician was Berenger
of Tour who by his logical arguments initiated the Eucharistic Crisis. He subjected the
tentative argument for transubstantiation to dialectical scrutiny. If during the Eucharist
the substance of bread and wine changes into the substance of the body and blood of
Christ, the accidents of the respective substances should also change appropriately. Since
no change in accident can be observed after the ritual takes place, the host must not
change in substance, but rather in some other way. Berenger argued that since, as
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Aristotle says, all things are a composite of form and matter, the host could change from
bread and wine to the body and blood of Christ if the form changed rather than the
matter. 123 Neverthless, the Church did not accept Berenger's reasoning and he eventually
recanted his opinion.
One of Berenger's major critics was Lanfranc, the abbot of the monastery ofBec
and mentor of the future St. Anselm. Anselm adopted his master's orthodoxy. Rather
than allow logic to control the direction of inquiry and risk crossing the line from proper
dogma into heterodoxy as Berenger had, Anselm used logic to uphold the Church's
authoritative position. While a man like Berenger may have been tolerated or lightly
reproached in an earlier era, with the reform movement underway a threat to the Chruch's
ability to define doctrine also called its other arguments into question, arguments which
were necessary as the foundation of the movement. Anselm demonstrated this use of
logic to support religious authority in his argument for God's existence.
Anselm argued that God's existence was logically necessary:
Hence even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at
least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he
understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And
assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the
understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is
greater. 124
Anselm's fool has claimed that God does not exist, but Anselm showed that since God's
existence is logically necessary only a fool could make such a claim. Anselm's argument
shows what a useful tool logic could be when it was applied to religious questions by the
right hands. One of Anselm's opponents-none other than Roscelin, Abelard's first
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instructor-displayed the dangers of pushing logic to far.
Unfortunately nothing of Roscelin's writing survives, and any of his claims must
be pieced together from counterarguments made by his critics. Based on Anselm's
refutation of him, Roscelin belonged to a nascent group of anti-realist philosophers
usually called vocalists. The vocalists made the problem of universals and particulars the
most pressing problem in twelfth-century logic. While Anselm had merely assumed
realism without defending it, the anti-realists took issue with this unqualified assumption
and used logic to show that realism was incoherent. 125 The problem of universals already
had a long history in western philosophy, but the Church's settling on realism as the
bedrock for what it defined as religious orthodoxy renewed the debate, though now
primarily as an issue of logic rather than of metaphysics. Understanding the problem
requires a knowledge of the technical vocabulary on universals and particulars in use
since the days of the ancient philosophers. Neither realists nor anti-realists crafted much
new vocabulary or many new definitions, as their goal was to find a harmonious
resolution to the problem rather than create new positions.
Most of the initial definitions came from Aristotle, who in the Categories defined
the terms twelfth-century intellectuals used in the debate on universals. While "thing" is
an ambiguous, indeterminate term in everyday speech, it became a technical term in
medieval logic following Aristotle's definitions. Though he gives them no proper names,
Arsitotle's things are the same as Porphyry's predicables. 126 Rather than developing an
ontology, Aristotle sought primarily to define how the term "thing" might be used in an

125 Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 25.
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argument. He also, in On Interpretation, described universal and particular things. A
universal can apply to many things by demonstrating a category to which they belong
while a particular, such as a proper name, signifies an individual. 127 Since he did not
specifically state what type of existence, if any, a universal had in his writings available
to twelfth-century philosophers, they had to search his works and elsewhere for clues.
Porphyry's Introduction or Isagoge further clarified Aristotle's definitions, but his
refusal to answer certain questions stirred the imagination of later scholars. In the
beginning of the work Porphyry states he will lay aside the questions as to whether
genera and species have real existence, whether they are material or immaterial, and
whether they mental or extramental. 128 Obviously the second and third question are
irrelevant unless the first is answered in favor of real rather than conceptual existence.
Besides providing important questions, Porphyry also established genera and species as
the universals which primarily qualified as things. They therefore became fixations in
arguments on universals.
Boethius followed Porphyry's precedents, but attempt to answer the unanswered
questions. He would use a dialectical method of showing the incoherence of the
positions he wished to argue against prior to making an affirmative argument, the same
method used by scholastic philosophers throughout the Middle Ages. 129 Rather than
explain how the concept of a universal thing might be attacked by looking at the meaning
of "thing," Boethius instead focuses on the definition ofa universal as a thing common to
many things. The obvious argument against the existence of universals is that a universal
127 Ibid., 47.
128 Porphyry, lsagoge, 27-28.
129 Paul Vincent Spade, ed. and trans., Five Texts an the Medieval Problem a/Universals: Parphyry.
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is one thing, but one thing cannot be common to many unless it is common to its parts
such as how a human body is common to its organs, common through successive
possession like a horse or slave that has had many owners over time, or common through
the experience of multiple entities as a play is common to multiple viewers.13o Genus and
species are not common in these ways, and Boethius's three examples of things that are
common to many are themselves particulars except for the play which is more an event
than an existing entity. Since genus and species are not common to things in any of the
ways Boethius explains, he concludes they are nothing at all.
To argue that universals do exist, he shows the invalidity of this claim. If genera
and species are nothing, then ideas of them come from nothing. This cannot be, since
only nothing comes from nothing. If they are only ideas with no firm basis other than the
particular things they supposedly represent, then objective knowledge of particular things
becomes suspect, since things in the world change constantly, but knowledge must be
certain. Particular things are easy to know through the senses, but the mind can abstract
the concepts of genus and species from the sense data. If genus and species are only
concepts abstracted from sense data but with no real existence of their own, a
discontinuity between thought and reality emerges leaving a mass of skepticism in its
wake and reducing knowledge to mere opinion. 131 This method of arguing which Plato
also used in the form of dialogues became the standard method of all medieval
philosophic investigation. Abelard used it himself, but he did not invent it; he learned it
when he read the foundational texts under Roscelin's tutelage.
Boethius offers a solution based on his understanding of Aristotle and Porphyry,
130 Ibid., 22.
131 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, Augustine to Scotus, 139.
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though he backs away from the argument soon after completing it:
Therefore, things like this [i.e. universals] exist in corporeals and sensibles, but
they are understood apart from sensibles, so that their nature can be gazed on and
their distinguishing peculiarity comprehended. For this reason, when genera and
species are thought, their likeness is gathered from the single things they exist in.
For example, from single men, dissimilar among themselves, the likeness of
humanity is gathered. This likeness, thought by the mind and gazed at truly, is the
species. Again, the likeness of these diverse species, which likeness cannot exist
except in these species or in their individuals, makes a genus when it is
considered. 132
Boethius's answer sounds like a moderate realist or conceptualist solution. A universal
can only be understood apart from a particular within the mind, but the concept is
abstracted from the similarities between the individual natures of particulars. Boethius
quickly qualifies that he suggests the argument not because he sincerely believes it, but
because his sources lead to it: "But we have carefully followed out Aristotle's view here,
not because we would recommend it the most, but because this book, [the Isagoge], is
written about the Categories, of which Aristotle is the author."133 By claiming better
solutions to the problem of universals existed than his own, Boethius left the debate to
continue well into the middle ages.
Roscelin initiated an intellectual feud with Anselm by applying his own view of
universals and particulars to the Trinity. Rather than use logic to prove a doctrine of
faith, Roscelin submitted a doctrine to logical scrutiny to find its implications. He argued
from the anti-realist position that the Trinity was a word rather than a thing. For the
Trinity to be an existent thing, the Father as well as the Son would have had to have
become incarnate in Jesus, because the Trinity is said to be one substance with three
Persons. Since only the Son became incarnate, the Persons of the Trinity would have to
132 Spade, Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals, 24.
133 Ibid., 25.
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be separate entities, and thus the word Trinity referred to no thing but was simply a word
used to refer to a collection of three things. Such an argument implied Christianity was
polytheistic and was thus obviously heretical, and Anselm sought to denounce Roscelin
in 1090. 134 Roscelin managed to save himself by recanting his argument, but he remained
a controversial figure.
Roscelin belonged to a group of dialecticians called the vocales because they
believed that dialectic analyzed words rather than things. 135 Anselm mocked Roscelin's
ideas, claiming that Roscelin believed a universal was only ajlatus vocis, a puff of air
exiting the mouth as the word is spoken. 136 Since Boethius claimed that a universal was a
thing common to many things, but no such thing could be experienced, Roscelin claimed
that the spoken word itself, which medieval philosophers considered a thing since the
puff of air was a body, was the only thing common to many things. Whatever the
ontology of universals or however the human mind may come to know them, human
beings think in language, therefore, any universal concept must be expressed through
words. 137 While vox is often translated as "word," it is closer in meaning to "voice." A

vox is any articulated vocal sound made as the vocal cords vibrate the air. Roscelin's
teaching may have been considerably more complex. None of Roscelin's writing on the
subject survives, and the term ''flatus vocis" comes from Anselm's counter arguments.
Anselm was not unknown to engage in philippics and straw man arguments against his
opponents, but it is clear Roscelin did not believe the realist definition of a universal held
merit. 138
134 Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 21-22.
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Unsurprisingly, Abelard became suspicious of realist solutions due to his course
work with Roscelin. As seen earlier, Abelard studied under William of Champeaux in
Paris after leaving Roscelin's tutelage. William initially argued what is referred to as
"exaggerated realism" or "material essence realism." This argument says the numerically
singular essence of a species is present in all members of the species, and the members of
the species only differ by their accidents. 139 After Abelard's disproved this idea, William
adopted indifference realism, which states that "man" maybe predicated of both Socrates
and Plato, because they do not differ in being a man. The universal thus applies to the
two particulars in this example indifferently rather than essentially. 140 Abelard found this
argument unconvincing as well.
Though he refuted William directly during class by explaining the obvious flaw in
the exaggerated realist solution was the contradiction between the essence being
numerically one but also existing in multiple locations, Abelard wrote his formal
refutations to realism years later in his Logica Ingredientibus. 141 Though likely composed
before 1120, Abelard fought with William on the subject of universals in the early 1100s.
His more mature mind would properly delineated the arguments at this later date. 142 To
make his refutation Abelard relied on the reductio ad absurdum which can make his
reasoning difficult to follow, particularly since Abelard could not avail himself of modem
logical symbols:
But perhaps it will be said that according to this opinion rationality and
irrationality are not less contraries because they are found in the same thing, i.e. in
139 John Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy (480 -1150): An Introduction (New York: Routledge,
1988), 132; Jordan, Western Philosophy From Antiquity to the Middle Ages, 337; Brower and Guilfoy,
The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, 66.
140 Bellows, The Story of My Misfortunes, 5-6.
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the same genus or in the same species, unless they are also grounded in the same
individual. But this also is shown: rationality and irrationality are, indeed, in the
same individual because they are in Socrates. They are simultaneously in
Socrates and Brunellus. But Socrates and Brunellus are Socrates. Socrates and
Brunellus are indeed Socrates, because Socrates is Socrates and Brunellus, and
this because Socrates is Socrates and Socrates is Brunellus. It is shown as follows
that, according to this opinion, Socrates is Brunellus: Whatever is in Socrates
other than the forms of Socrates is that which is in Brunellus other than the forms
of Brunellus. But whatever is in Brunellus other than the forms of Brunellus is
Brunellus. Whatever, then, is in Socrates other than the forms of Socrates is
Brunellus. But if this is the case, since Socrates is that which is other than the
forms of Socrates, then Socrates himself is Brunellus. 143
William had stated that the universal essence inhered in particulars, but that it became
differentiated into particulars through accidents that Abelard here refers to as "forms,"
which the particulars themselves did not share with each other. Abelard believed that
William's argument that a universal, numerically one material essence of two or more
particulars would lead to the implication that the material essence contained contradictory
qualities like rationality and irrationality. William countered that these would only be
contrary if found within the same particular, but Abelard found this explanation wanting,
as they would be within the same particular by being within the universal.
Without modem variables, modifiers, and operators, Abelard had to explain his
argument in everyday Latin vocabulary. He chose "Socrates," the variable for a human
being defined as "mortal rational animal" and "Brunellus," a common name for a donkey
which is defined as irrational. The name Brunellus is Latin for "Browny," a name as
familiar to medieval students as "Socrates."144 Socrates and Brunellus share the universal
animal as their material essence, so Abelard must prove that Socrates and Brunellus as a
pair are equivalent to Socrates. If this is so, then Socrates has the contradictory
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properties of rationality and irrationality; William's argument will be shown to be
contradictory and therefore false. William claimed that as individuals Socrates and
Brunellus were not the same, because they were separated by their distinctive accidents.
The material essence is whatever is in Socrates and Brunellus with exception to these
forms. This leads to an absurd conclusion. Whatever is in Brunellus other than his
accidents is his material essence, which has already been defined as mortal irrational
animal. Socrates shares this material essence, but is differentiated from Brunellus by his
rationality, therefore he possesses both rationality and irrationality even ifhe is said to be
a different manifestation of the material essence animal, while Abelard added insult to
injury by claiming that anyone who believed in material essence realism would have to
believe that Socrates was an ass. William did not cease to advocate for realism in the
face of Abelard's attack, but no one, not even William, seriously advocated for material
essence realism again. This is Abelard's most influential contribution to the western
intellectual tradition, and scholars often attribute the later shift away from extreme forms
of realism to Abelard's argument. They fail to realize that realism itself remained the
dominant medieval view of universals, and several scholars other than Abelard
questioned its validity.
William altered his realist argument slightly, but Abelard still found it
unconvincing. The second argument did, however, influence Abelard's future
conclusions. Socrates and Plato both fall under the universal "human being," because
they do not differ from each other in their being human. 145 Abelard easily dismissed this
idea: "There are those who understand that agreeing in human being negatively as if it

145 Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy. 132.
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were said: Socrates does not differ from Plato in human being. But we could also say
that he does not differ from Plato in stone since neither is a stone.,,146 Since a negative
cannot be properly proved, arguments in favor of realism must be affirmative. Proving
that Socrates and Plato do not differ in being human is not as powerful as proving that
they agree in something. Yet the idea that diverse particulars could be described as
"being" something did interest Abelard though not as an argument in favor of universals.
Abelard had only refuted William's argument; he did not provide a competing claim for
what a universal might be during his challenges to William in the classroom.
Nevertheless, the logical dispute between master and student had become personal.
William's students found Abelard's anti-realism more convincing, prompting them to
begin taking classes from Abelard. Deprived of any students to teach, William took vows
and entered a monastery.147 Though his victory had cemented his reputation as a gifted
intellectual, it won Abelard enemies as well. William was exceptionally well connected
and an advocate of reform, which relied on some form of realism as a philosophic basis
for its vision. Just as Roscelin had made himself suspect by redefining the Trinity in an
unorthodox way, Abelard's challenge to realism as well as his humiliation of William
marked him as a possible enemy of the movement, especially when considered with his
association with Stephen de Garlande. Some of Abelard's popularity was no doubt due to
his reputation as a rebel rather than to the power of his argument.
While Abelard and William became personal enemies, and Abelard remained
unconvinced of the validity of William's arguments, he did borrow facets of William's
indifference realism just as he had borrowed from Roscelin. William had stated that
146 Bosley and Tweedale, Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy, 383.
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"human being" was a universal since Plato and Socrates did not differ in being human.
Abelard coined a new term, the status, for this, but" the status of human being [is] its
being a human, which is not a thing."148 Since the status is not a thing, it cannot be a
universal in the realist sense, but the term is important for Abelard's later intellectual
endeavors. What Abelard had discovered was that no thing in existence could fulfill the
Boethian definition for a universal and therefore, as he claims, "it remains to ascribe
universality to utterances alone,"149 which sounds like a nominalist claim. Roscelin had
made a similar claim, but his vocalism was significantly more crude and naIve than
Abelard's view. Roscelin had claimed that the only universal was the flatus vocis; the
word itself applied to many things. For the vocalists like Roscelin, words were things.
Abelard's understanding is more abstract, because he makes a distinction between a vox,
which refers to Roscelin'sflatus vocis, and a senno, which signifies the abstract concept
behind a word that allows it to be predicated. 150
In academia, arguing from the via media is often an easy solution. The advocate
does not have reinvent the issue, discover new technical language, nor invest time in
original research. He may merely pluck bits and pieces from the arguments of others to
make his point. If he is diligent, he avoids the obvious counter arguments that may have
foiled the endeavors of the authors of his sources. Effectively he takes a position by
refusing to take one, thus rendering his argument unassailable, and Abelard knew that in
logic the correct answer is the one which cannot be disproven. Abelard's argument
cannot be considered innovative based solely on its content.
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Logic is an odd discipline in that it is a content free fonn of reasoning. The
logician does not look to what is said, but the fonn in which it is said. Abelard's
contribution to the problem of universals follows the dialectical pattern associated with
most scholastic philosophy. He disproves competing claims before making his own. He
even assumes that William's argument must be true so that he can prove it implies a
contradiction. The method was as old as many of the sources Abelard read at Roscelin's
feet. Boethius makes use of it extensively in his commentary on Porphyry. Abelard did
not invent this style of arguing; indeed he himself had been taught by others to use it.
Through his cleverness Abelard had shown what a powerful tool dialectic could be, and
how thoroughly a reductio ad absurdum could destroy an argument, but many other
students learned these methods in the twelfth century, often from the same men who
instructed Abelard.
Abelard's attack on realism did make him a celebrity. He dared to assaulte a
widely held, Church-sponsored philosophic view. As a teacher, William likely would
have expected his students to argue against him from time to time, but Abelard arrogantly
humiliated William in front of his other students, left class, and set himself up as a master
in his own right at the tender age of twenty-two. Though he certainly attributed his
success to his own brilliance, Abelard must have had help from Stephen de Garlande,
even if no fonnal process of certifying teachers existed. Abelard's brazen actions
certainly made him attractive to many students who saw him as a rebel against advocates
for what once had been a revolutionary movement in the Church, but by now was
beginning to become the status quo. Such views rendered Abelard suspect in the eyes of
the refonners who now considered him a personal enemy. Whatever perspective one may
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choose, Abelard's choice of career, field of study, method of arguing, and contribution all
remain consistent with the environment and trends of twelfth-century France. What at
the time seemed novel is actually a manifestation of a deeply set conformity.
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THEOLOGY AND THE TRINITY

The Trinity represents a difficult puzzle in Christian doctrine, which is what made
it so suitable a topic for Abelard to teach. In the early years of the Church a number of
intellectual heretics such as Arius and Sabellius violated the orthodox view by claiming
either that there was no unity in the Trinity or that there was no distinction between the
Persons. Abelard himself saw how the arguments of his contemporaries could lead to
further heresy. Roscelin's vocalism led either to unitarianism or trideism while William's
realism ended in pantheism. 151 Abelard's students, having already passed through his
curriculum on logic, wished him to go further by applying that logic to the doctrine of the
Trinity. According to Abelard, his students claimed "that it was futile to utter words
which the intellect could not possibly follow, that nothing could be believed unless it
could first be understood, and that it was absurd for anyone to preach to others a thing
which neither he himself nor those whom he sought to teach could comprehend."152 To
fulfill his students' request, Abelard sought to provide a logical justification for the
Trinity.
Before articulating any claim of his own, Abelard had to study the previous claims
made about the Trinity, especially those made by Augustine and Boethius, both to
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comprehend the technical language surrounding the problem as well as to understand the
nature of the issue itself. The problem of the Trinity seems to relate to number. It
includes the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in one God, but one does not equal three.
Augustine had, however, envisioned a case in which things might be the same and
distinct: "But as there are two things, the mind and the love of it, when it loves itself; so
there are two things, the mind and the knowledge of it, when it knows itself. Therefore
the mind itself, and the love of it, and the knowledge of it, are three things, and these
three are one, and when they are perfect, they are equal."153 In some sense, these things
are identical, because they all arise from the same entity and cannot exist unless the
others exist as well. Yet selflove and self awareness are also not quite the same as the
mind; self love cannot think nor can self awareness feel. Augustine had provided an
example in which things could be considered the same and different, and thus Abelard
understood the problem of the Trinity to be an issue of identity and distinction rather than
arithmetic.
Boethius too had composed a work on the Trinity, in which he states: The belief of
this faith concerning the unity of the Trinity is as follows: "The Father they say is God,
the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one
God, not three Gods."154 While this is the conclusion that must be reached to provide
correct understanding of the Trinity, Boethius does not demonstrate how this arrangement
is logically possible. He does state that "the cause of this union is the absence of
difference,,,155 but does not state how this view can be harmonized with the distinction
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between the Persons. While he goes on to give a number of cases in which things may be
said to be the same or different along with a great deal of other Christian mystical
digressions, he never mentions a case in which something may logically be said to be
both the same and distinct. He claims only that the Persons of the Trinity differ in
number without differing in essence, never offering a clue as to how this particular
argument can be sustained. 156
Obviously Abelard did not feel these arguments were quite sufficient. Meeting
the new challenges to the Church's control of doctrine would require new arguments
based on sound reason. Just as Anselm of Bec had shown that only a fool could claim
that God did not exist, Abelard hoped to demonstrate that the Church's teachings were
logically coherent while any counter claim was of such invalidity that it could be claimed
only by the witless. By teaching his students through the application of logic to religious
doctrine, Abelard could thus introduce a new approach to the teaching of theology.
Ultimately he found distinctions between the meaning of "sameness" and "difference" as
they applied to essence, number, and definition allowed him to explain the unity of the
Trinity.
Abelard's first theological monograph on this subject, the Theologia "Summi
boni, " was condemned for Roscelin's crime oftrideism at the Council ofSoissons. 157
Abelard expanded the material of his original work in subsequent editions titled
Theologia Christiana and Theologia Scholarium. 158 Abelard knew to remain orthodox he
would have to argue that each of the Persons of the Trinity is co-eternal and none of them
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exists prior or posterior to the others either temporally or logically. 159 The unity in
essence among the Persons overcomes this issue, but it does not sustain the distinction of
the Persons, and Abelard's attempts to provide analogies and metaphors for this
distinction made him heterodox in the eyes of the religious authorities, thus dooming his
reputation and eventually ending his career under a papal ban of perpetual silence which
lasted until his death a short time later.
Much like Aristotle, Abelard provides definitions and examples of all the
philosophic vocabulary he needs to make his argument, then like Boethius or many of his
own contemporaries probes these definitions for ambiguities which will allow him to
reach a conclusion. What the ancient and Patristic philosophers had proven was taken by
Abelard and other medieval philosophers not only to be true, but also along with scripture
all anyone required to make any theological argument. Any time philosophy seemed to
clash with religious truth, the conflict was resolved with a distinction in the meaning of
one source or another. Though they were heavily reliant on the work of previous
philosophers, medieval philosophers did not confine themselves merely to repetitions of
previous scholarship. Abelard himself, to combat the influence of his old teacher
Roscelin, claims that the fact Porphyry did not discuss a type of difference which relates
specifically to the difference between the Persons "poses no problem for us .... There are
many other types of difference besides those Porphyry distinguishes which we are forced
to allow.,,16o As a neo-platonist, Porphyry had no interest in providing an apology for the
Trinity, nor did he provide an exhaustive list of examples for every type of difference; he
provided the definitions of difference itself which, as a logician, Abelard sought to exploit
159 Brower and Guilfoy, The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, 70.
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in his own formal proof. Even so, Abelard provided no innovative redefinition of
sameness or difference.
Abelard begins by defining essential sameness as a state occurring when two or
more things "have numerically the same essence, in the sense that this and that are
numerically the same essence."161 Abelard does not mean essentia here to mean quiditas,
that which makes something what it is, as later philosophers often did. In twelfth-century
usage, "essence" is synonymous with "thing," and in this case essential sameness is
numeric sameness, meaning the Trinity is not a collection of three gods or even divine
substances, since the Persons are numerically the same thing. 162 To clarify, Abelard
claims that "a blade and a sword are numerically the same essence,"163 because the Latin
words ensis and mucro which mean "sword" and "blade" are held to be so alike in
meaning that they are interchangeable and therefore refer to the exact same thing. 164
Abelard has thus given a definition for essential sameness that relies on numerical
sameness.
Abelard mentions that things may possess essential sameness, "even though they
are distinguished by their distinguishing features.,,165 If two distinguishing features
inhere in the same thing, then the thing is understood to be the same rather than two
separate things even though the distinguishing features are different, thus things might be

different without necessarily being separate. Abelard cites a typically Aristotelian
distinction between form and matter which together form an essence. In a wax seal used
to seal correspondence, the image of the seal is distinct from the wax, because they differ
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in distinguishing feature-the wax is material while the image itself is not-yet they are
the same essentially since they cannot be separated from the wax seal. 166
Abelard also defined what might be called definitional sameness. Entities possess
this type of sameness when they are identical to each other "like a blade and a sword, or
Marcus and Tullius ... For not only is a blade a sword and a sword a blade, but also it is
a sword from the very fact that it is a blade."167 The negation must also hold, so whatever
is not alike in definition cannot be one thing from the very fact that it is another. With
each of these definitions in concert, Abelard claims that the Persons of the Trinity are
essentially the same since they are numerically one God, but they differ from each other
in distinguishing feature and definition:
The Persons, i.e. the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are diverse from each
other in a way like that in which those items are diverse which are diverse in
definition or in distinguishing feature, i.e. by the fact that, although completely
the same essence which is God the Son or God the Holy Spirit is God the Father,
still one item is distinctive of God the Father, i.e. inasmuch as the essence is the
Father, and another distinctive of the Son, and still another of the Holy Spirit. 168
Though Abelard has explicated the multiple ways things may be the same and different,
in combining them and applying them to the Persons, he made an unfortunate error,
leading to his trial at Soisssons where he was, like Roscelin, charged with Trideism, even
though it was this heterodox reasoning of Roscelin 's that Abelard had wished to
disprove. 169 Near the end of Abelard's life two decades after that council, Bernard, after
scrutinizing Abelard's writings, worked to secure Abelard's second condemnation at
Sens, ending his career as a theologian. Abelard's writings on the Trinity were certainly
controversial in his own day, especially given that many of the powerful men who
166 Ibid.
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168 Ibid., 325.
169 Mews, "Abelard, Bernard, and the Fear of Social Upheaval," 359.
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condemned them did not possess Abelard's expertise in logic and perhaps interpreted his
texts in a way he did not intend, but he certainly was not unique in attempting to find a
proper understanding for the Trinity, nor were his arguments influential on future
generations given their condemned status.
Though Abelard did apply logic to theology in a manner which had not been
practiced in the West at all since the days of John Scotus Eriugena and had not been
widespread since Augustine's condemnation of natural theology in the City of God, this
fact marks his era as distinct from its past rather than rendering Abelard unique among
his contemporaries. Berenger and Roscelin had made much more radical claims than
Abelard had, though they suffered less for having made them than Abelard suffered for
his. Anselm ofBec, in his genius, had shown that only a fool believes God did not exist
and did so without recourse to pagan philosophy or patristic sources. Abelard seized the
historical imagination through his actions and writings, but he was not so much a new
man as a manifestation of a new historical context within the the Middle Ages, a context
in which scholars sought to provide a rational basis for religious doctrine and resolve
conflicts between authoritative sources.
The Trinity had always been a problem for Christian philosophers, and while
Abelard offered his own interpretation of it, he had not brought the problem to the
attention of the educated elite. Augustine himself had wrestled with providing a logical
defense of the Trinity, and indeed had done so by arguing that things could be
simultaneously the same and distinct according to various definitions for sameness and
distinction. Abelard's analogy that compares the Trinity to a wax image whereby the
matter itself is not the same as the image imprinted on it, even though the two categories
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can only be separated in the mind but never in nature, is strikingly similar to Augustine's
example of the issue of identity and distinction between mental phenomena and the mind
itself. Though not expressed in similar formulae, the logic behind each argument is
consistent. In form Abelard's argument is not significantly different from the claims
written before his. Unlike Boethius, he does attempt a serious answer, but true to
scholastic form, he cites authorities, compiles definitions, and unravels counter arguments
before beginning his own. Abelard's theological monographs do not represent an attempt
at a new field or an exploration into the true depths of knowledge so much as a practical
guide written for students to explain how the official teaching of the Trinity was in fact
the best, and how that doctrine might be logically explained and upheld against the
fallacious arguments of the heretics that claimed the Church could not define doctrine
because of its corruption. Nonetheless, Abelard's many enemies succeeded in
condemning him on the basis of his argument at Soissons in 1121. Abelard decided that
though his argument was correct, in the future he would need to place more emphasis on
authority in his theological writings than he had before Soissons, and therefore he busied
himself researching in the library of St. Denis. l7O This exercise would lead to the second
of Abelard's theological contributions.
While compiling authoritative sources, Abelard saw a significant problem which
would confuse students and play into the arguments of the heretics: many of the
authorities contradicted each other. Many of the books of scripture even contradicted the
others, although scripture was divinely inspired and thus perfect. Abelard even found
that the Venerable Bede did not agree with the abbot Hilduin on the identity of St. Denis,

170 Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 126.
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and he again returned to his old ways of angering his brothers, this time by continually
reminding them that Bede claimed the founder of their monastery was not the famous
Dionysius the Areopagite. 171 Abelard was not the only one to find the contradictions in
authority troubling. Though he had originally intended to collect quotes and organize
them for easy reference during his writing, he found that his personal reference work
could be immensely useful in teaching students to analyze authoritative sources for their
meaning rather than simply their content.
Abelard took each quote he found which contradicted another on a single issue
and organized them into opposed columns centered on 153 theological questions, titling
the work Sic et Non or Yes and No. 172 Each issue Abelard chose to represent within the
text grants insight into his thinking and include such topics as: "that no human sexual
union may be without fault and not; that God is tripartite and against; that God is the
cause or progenitor of evils and not."173 Though Abelard never rationalized or explained
the contradictions, his recognition of them was not an attempt to undermine the Church's
authority or question the value of authoritative sources; he wished these questions to
serve as classroom exercises which would train students to harmonize what only
appeared to be contradiction. 174 Many later historians have given improper appraisals of
the Sic et Non by failing to realize that like his theological monographs on the Trinity,
Abelard intended this book to be used primarily by his own students rather than a wider
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audience. 175 It is a text book rather than a polemic, and its prologue explains how to
resolve the apparent but illusory contradictions between authorities.
Much of the incorrect assessment comes from the fact that Abelard does not in the
main body of the text provide a model for solving the problems brought forth by these
apparent contradictions. After his difficulties at the Council of Soissons, Abelard would
have been in no mood to attempt to further challenge the Church and bring greater
scrutiny upon himself. To remain orthodox, he would have to claim that each source was
correct despite the contradiction. A simple reading of the texts would not suffice to
sustain the authority of both, and so Abelard had to teach students how dialectic might be
used to analyze conflicting texts. A reading of the prologue of the work clearly illustrates
that Abelard intended the text to be used in this way, rather than as a display of the lack of
concord or logic within the Church. To encourage the use of reason in theological
analysis, Abelard claimed that apparent contradictions in the authoritative writings did
not appear because of real conflicts, but because of the limits of the untrained human
understanding:
Let us not presume to denounce them as liars, or disparage them as erroneous, to
whom God has said (Lk 10.16) "Whoever listens to you, listens to me; and
whoever rejects you, rejects me." And so, seeking refuge in our feebleness, let us
believe it is due more to our lack of understanding, than to their failure in
writing: to them, Truth said (Mt 10.20) "It is not you who are speaking, but
the spirit of your Father which speaks in you. 176
Unlike the heretics, Abelard claims the inability to understand scripture and the works on
the patristic thinkers arises not from the texts themselves or from any failure on the part
of their authors. A mind which can only read the words without understanding their
175 Sikes, Peter Abailard, 78; Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 137.
176 Priscilla Throop, trans., Yes and No: The Complete Translation ofAbelard's Sic et Non (Charlotte:
MedievaIMS, 2007), 11.
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forms or the intentions of the original author cannot correctly understand a text, and so
not only is reason required, but anyone who attempts to interpret such texts must also be
properly trained in the application of reason lest many erroneous and contradictory
interpretations be given.
Through the prologue Abelard instructs the reader according to his method of
dialectical resolution. When two sources seemed to contradict each other, the careful
reader would "seek to reconcile the opposing position according to the difference of
intention."177 Freed from the constraints of exaggerated realism by his previous work in
logic, Abelard could be flexible in the meaning he attached to words. In isolation two
passages from two different authors might seem to contradict one another if the same
meaning had to apply to the words. When the words are instead seen as individual
reflections of the intention of the author rather than signifying a concrete thing which
exists apart from the mind, any dismissal of the texts as contradictory collapses into a
simple fallacy of equivocation. 178 On the subject of the reality of discourse, Abelard also
understood that the texts, especially those with which he and his contemporaries worked,
were not original copies. Scholars of the twelfth century had to write and teach as they
did due to lack of available texts. Quoting all the definitions and authorities from the
outset of an argument allowed students to copy as the master read which allowed students
access to materials they would not otherwise have. Much of this had to be committed to
memory, as the lack of available texts prevented referencing. 179 Copying and recopying
of works meant mistakes on the part ofthe scribe were inevitable in any text: "And so,
177 Ibid., 18.
178 Grane, Abelard, 88.
179 Gabriel Compayre, Abelard and the Origin and Early History of the Universities (New York: Charles
Scribener's Sons, 1893): 186-187.
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what wonder is it, if there were places in the Gospels corrupted by the ignorance of
scribes, that it might sometimes happen in the writings of the later fathers, which are of
far less authority?"180 A proper appreciation for the author's intention and the context of
the work should expose the errors that too literal a reading would evoke. Abelard's
lessons on Sic et Non allowed students to accuse people who quoted scripture without any
attempt at dialectical analysis of author's intention of being uncritical or irrational. 181
Such accusations in tum allowed them to dismiss the more sophisticated heretics who
attempted to reinterpret religious texts according to their own heterodox views.
The condemnation of Abelard's argument concerning the Trinity and his refusal to
give authoritative resolutions to the questions raised in Sic et Non ensured that Abelard's
influence had little to do with substance but much more to do with form. Many of
Abelard's texts including Sic et Non by their arrangement anticipate the formal quaestio
of later generations of medieval philosophers in which the author defines terms, quotes
authorities, and attacks counter arguments before arguing his own position. The
rudiments of such a manner of organization were prevalent enough in the sources twelfthcentury scholars often used-even Boethius organized his texts this way-that Abelard
cannot be credited with inventing them or even influencing their maturation. Most
masters taught such a method, and the desire of twelfth-century intellectuals to find
harmonious paths through apparently contradictory sources to stabilize the gains made by
Gregorian reform and defeat the various challenges to the Church that had arisen in its
wake ensured that many scholars other than Abelard adapted this form to their own
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needs. Much of the landscape of medieval philosophy and theology would remain
unchanged even without Abelard. The methods he used in Sic et Non found greater
influence through scholars who remained orthodox in the eyes of the Church.
Peter Lombard composed his own collection of contradictory quotations which he
titled the Sentences. Besides considering a much wider, more comprehensive number of
issues than did Abelard in Sic et Non, Lombard actually answered his questions. His
book became so influential that by the thirteenth century all university students studying
theology had to write commentaries on Lombard's Sentences. 182 Though he did write
shortly after Abelard, Lombard was more strongly influenced by the school of St. Victor,
which itself had been more influenced by the work of the students of none other than
Anselm of Laon, than by Abelard. 183 Ironically, the school of Laon began the practice of
organizing books of quotations of scripture and patristic sources long before Abelard
even began the Sic et Non. 184 Abelard gained attention from later scholars principally due
to his scandalous personal life. When they finally bothered much about his actual
intellectual contributions, they considered them in absence of many of the academic
trends of the twelfth century and declared either that Abelard was a radical free thinker
who undermined ecclesiastical authority or a profound influence upon later medieval
thought through his collection of patristic literature and attempts to rationalize their
discordance, but each of these activities had several other twelfth-century practitioners.
The fact that some of the them, like Lombard, succeeded Abelard while others preceded
him shows that Abelard was only one of the distinct intellectuals of his time. There is no
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evidence to claim that Abelard tacitly influenced later medieval philosophy and theology
by influencing Lombard, for Lombard had other models and served other masters. 18S
The use of dialectical methods to resolve apparent conflicts was not merely
confined to theology either. The Church had had to develop canon law in its conflicts
with secular authorities and continued to advance to ensure any actions against heretics
were appropriately sanctioned. Just as when it had attempted to provide authoritative
theology, the Church ran into legal problems when it discovered canon law could conflict
with itself as much as the Church Fathers had in their writings. While Abelard and
Lombard wished to impart some sanity to theology, the legal scholar Gratian attempted to
resolve the conflicts of canon law. Though Gratian did use dialectical methods like
Abelard, he was far more interested in the practical application of law than in any type of
legal speculation. In passages where Gratian considers theological issues, he was
probably much more influenced by his instruction under theologians at the University of
Bologna than by Abelard. 186 Since Gratian also solves his legal quandaries by declaring
one statute primary over another, it would make more logical sense to attribute any
theological influence upon Gratian to Lombard rather than Abelard.
One issue canon law had to address was land ownership, since the Church was no
longer a religious group but an entire institution which possessed large tracts of land,
much to the chagrin of the nobility. Gratian does not consider, as Abelard might, how to
resolve an apparent contradiction but rather how to argue properly that the Church can
own land: "The law of nature differs also from custom and statute. For by the law of
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nature all things are common to all men; ... But by the law of custom or statute, this is
mine, and that belongs to someone else."187 The problem is that God ordains the law of
nature, and truly all land is his rather than the Church's. Any further argument that the
Church may validly hold land will therefore require upholding the law of custom,
especially since the idea of property rights only exists in human law anyway. Gratian
thus slyly claims that Paul wished for the Church to respect secular law, and since it
allows the ownership of property, the Church may own land. 188
The multiple attempts to rationalize past contradictions were part of the twelfth
century mentality. Without some methodology for dealing with such issues, the change
brought on by Gregorian reform rested on weak foundations. The Church required some
kind of theoretical justification for its actions and dogmas rather than simple appeals to
authority or force. When sources for such justification were consulted, many
inconsistencies within the record appeared. Twelfth-century intellectuals, including
Abelard, were not willing to allow such inconsistencies to halt continued development.
In such a context Abelard's work looks consistent with the twelfth-century context rather
than breaking from it. Like Gratian and Lombard, he attempted to end debate over
authoritative sources. Abelard had no need or desire to be an eccentric innovator of
theology. Abelard was first and foremost a teacher rather than a professor. His
monographs on the Trinity and the Sic et Non were primarily meant to assist students in
developing their own theological understanding rather than initiate a debate among
experts or push the boundaries of theological knowledge. He wished to defend the
Church, the established order of which he was a part, from the attacks of popular heresy
187 Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), 1:34.
188 Ibid.
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rather than expose the weakness of Church authority. Demonstrating that what the
Church did teach was the most logical belief to hold was a means of solving this problem
rather than the quest of a visionary for the Truth.
Abelard can also not be held to be theologically influential in terms of the
trajectory of later medieval thought. The influence of Lombard and Gratian was quite
extensive, but Gratian wrote a practical work which did not require the incredibly
intricate knowledge of logic Abelard's works required. Lombard held the advantage of
orthodoxy. By angering Bernard, Abelard made perhaps the most powerful man in
Christendom his enemy. Pope Innocent II, at Bernard's behest, sentenced Abelard in
1140 to perpetual silence, condemned his work, and forbade his students to continue to
argue on behalf of their master's theology. 189 Even Abelard's immense arrogance could
enact little self-promotion under a papal ban. Later scholars would, after having been
blinded by his scandalous personal life, proceed to create the myth of Abelard's influence
and creativity based on similarities between his works and the works of later scholars
without reference to the intellectual context of the twelfth century and Abelard's conflicts
with religious authorities rather than accurately assess the value of his contribution within
its context.

189 Luscombe, The School ofPeter Abelard, 14.

82

ETHICS

While studies of ethics had been an important topic in ancient philosophy, early
medieval philosophers had not devoted much energy to continued study of the subject.
The revealed truth of Christ's ethical teaching and the writings of St. Augustine sufficed
for most ethical deliberation. By the twelfth century this trend began to shift, and ethics
again became important due to the changes initiated by Gregorian reform. A properly
informed ethical theory required both an understanding of dialectic to forge the
arguments and of theology to provide the unique Christian impetus behind ethical theory.
For the ancient Greeks only eudaimonia-happiness-was the central concern of ethics,
and the individual achieved this state through a kind of enlightened self-interest which
mediated his behavior toward both neighbor and state. Medieval ethical theory did not
reject eudaimonia, but redefined it according to Christian belief; ultimate happiness came
from union with God through reconciliation with him.190 The peculiar Christian concept
of sin meant that this reconciliation could only come about through Christ's sacrifice; no
mystery cult rituals or meditations on the neo-platonic god's emanations would do.
Avoiding sin required knowledge of what sin was, not through empirical observation
which would tarnish the soul, but rather through an acceptance of God's revelation and a
rational explanation based of that revelation. By avoiding sin it was hoped that an

190 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, Augustine to Scotus, 81.
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individual would practice virtue which was pleasing to God. Prior to the twelfth century,
medieval clergy could tell the laity of Christ's commandments and warn them to reject
sin, but the Gregorian reform movement made speculative rather than authoritative
ethical theory important again.
Reform had made the behavior of clergy a key issue by reemphasizing monastic
discipline and attempting to end corruption among priests and bishops. In doing so the
reformers had made priests-and their sins-more visible among the common people.
The reformers had encouraged the people to dissent from recalcitrant clergy, but when it
became evident that not every wayward priest could be corrected the dissent continued to
the point that it even began to threaten the ecclesiastical hierarchy that had unleashed it. 191
The Church required a more systematic philosophy of ethics both to enforce the renewed
Gregorian reform discipline among the clergy and to answer the challenges made by the
populist heretics. Ultimately defeating Donatism would require a defense of the Church's
prerogative to define ethical behavior and an attack on the heretics' competing ethical
ideas.
One of the more significant reasons the early medieval church had not speculated
much on ethics had been its concern for ritual and the theology of salvation. Having been
a Manichaean heretic himself, Augustine claimed the material world and human beings
within it were inherently corrupt, and so they required Christ's salvation to escape
damnation. Mercifully, Christ allowed the human race salvation through his sacrifice, to
which Christians must attach themselves through obedience to the Church and proper
observation of religious ritual. The key then to ensuring salvation for as much of the
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human race as possible lay in properly codifying prayer and the mass; ethical
considerations were completely secondary. No mere mortal possessed enough worth in
the eyes of God to warrant his salvation, and no act, however laudable, could earn it. An
ethical life might indicate that a person was a true believer, but certainly the Greeks and
Romans could provide ample examples of moral virtue which did them no good in the
end. With little attention given to the moral value of behavior, less was paid to the
intentions and motives for such behavior. Outward observance of religious ritual
differentiated the Christian from the pagan.
The low point of Church history which preceded Gregorian reform had
adequately proven that even a bishop might be a shinning example of Christian piety in
his official conduct, but his privat behavior could still be wanting. In this new context
many people became aware of the hypocrisy of religious figures as well as that of lay
people. Discontent with this awareness manifested both in the heretics' condemnation of
empty ritual and the reform monasteries demand for greater discipline among the
monks. 192 The Gregorian reform movement had made moral intention an issue in need of
definition, making it yet another matter of the twelfth-century intelligentsia. Abelard and
Heloise shared this renewed emphasis on ethical theory, due to the role of hypocrisy.
Abelard allowed the sentiment to seep into his scriptural exegsis. In his Exposition of the
Epistle to the Romans, Abelard, much like the heretics, attacks empty religious ritual, but
he attacks that of the Old Testament rather than that of the New:
"Because by the works of the law"-that is by outward observances of the law to
which that people gave studious attention, such as circumcision, sacrifices,
keeping the Sabbath, and other symbolic ordinances of the same kind-"no flesh
shall be justified in his sight"-that is, in God's sight. All such as fulfill the law
192 Ibid., 48.
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merely according to the flesh and not according to the spirit will be accounted
righteous in men's sight, perhaps-that is, according to human judgment which
judges from outward and visible appearances-but not in God's."193
Heloise, after entering the religious life at Abelard's behest, felt a more personal
acquaintance with hypocrisy. Though she had become an abbess and was much praised
for her piety, she explained to Abelard in one of her famous letters her feelings of guilt
for desiring him despite her vows: "They preach that I am chaste who have not
discovered the hypocrite in me. They make the purity of the flesh into a virtue, when it is
a virtue not of the body but of the mind. Having some praise among men, I deserve none
before God, Who tries out the heart and the reins and sees in the secret places."194 While
Heloise felt she was a hypocrite for entering the convent, Abelard feared her continued
pining for him would lead to her damnation. 195 What the Church Fathers had preached as
proper conduct-the correct completion of religious ritual-now became seen by twelfthcentury intellectuals as yet another type of behavior which did not guarantee salvation.
For an action to be commendable twelfth-century thought held that it had to be motivated
by the right reasons. Abelard certainly had many cases from his own life, including his
relationship with Heloise, to provide him with examples of the influence of intention on
ethical action, but he was not alone in this pursuit. Even scholars Abelard heavily
disparaged like Anselm of Laon gave attention to speculative approaches to the role of
intention in ethics. Abelard again epitomized the twelfth-century ethos of resolving
apparent contradictions in authoritative sources to combat heresy and again failed to
influence the trajectory of the discipline, not only because of his condemnation at Sens
193 Eugene R. Fairweather, ed. and trans., A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, vol. 10 of The
Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), 277.
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but also because he left the body of his work on ethics unfinished and the recovery of
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics inspired scholars to write works which would eclipse
Abelard's own.
Before he could attempt any of his own work on ethics, Abelard had to consult a
number of documents including the writings of previous authorities and his
correspondence with Heloise. Of the Church fathers, Augustine, even after the recovery
of Aristotle, exerted the most significant influence upon medieval ethical thought. 196 Just
as Abelard had to defeat the arguments of the new groups of dualist heretics entering into
Europe, Augustine wrote his ethical treatises to overcome the theses of the Manichaean
heretics of his day. The Manichees too believed that the material world had been created
by a evil deity and was thus evil. They claimed sin was a substance created by this evil
god along with all other matter. Augustine used all the powers of his rhetoric to render
such arguments nugatory. He preserved God's perfection and goodness by claiming that
sin was not a substance: "For you evil does not exist, and not only for you but for the
whole of your creation as well, because there is nothing outside it which could invade it
and break down the order which you have imposed on it."197 If sin is not a substance and
God created all substances, God did not create sin. Just as darkness is a lack of light, so
too is sin a lack of virtue rather than a thing in itself. The limits of human language
unfortunately prevent the mind from conceiving of an absence as nothing rather than
something, and thus emerges the human error of conceiving of sin as something in need
of a creator for its existence. Augustine could legitimately claim that the Manchaean
argument that God created sin since he created everything was false, but his claim
196 Sikes, Peter Abelard, 180.
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established what sin was not rather than what sin was.
In a dialogue titled On Free Choice Augustine, rather like the Roman stoics and
epicureans, established sin as the result of inordinate desire. He used a sympathetic
example of a slave who killed his master in defense of his own life. Unlike a sociopath
who wishes only to murder to cause suffering or a robber who might use deadly force to
accomplish a theft, the slave had no desire to kill his master but rather only wished to
protect his own life. This motive seems good, since life is a good which should be
protected, and a life without fear would seem to be better still. Augustine, however,
believed that the slave's motive had led him to commit a murder rather than a justifiable
homicide:
To desire to live without fear is characteristic of all people, not only of the good,
but also of the bad. But there is this difference. The good seek it by diverting
their love from things which cannot be had without the risk of losing them. The
bad are anxious to enjoy these things with security and try to remove hindrances
so as to live a wicked and criminal life which is better called death. 198
The desire itself is neither good nor bad; all people, good and evil, desire a life without
fear. Here Augustine shows his stoic approach in claiming that the urge to protect that
which is common to the good and evil alike is an indifferent rather than inherently good
motive. The slave's sin lay in his inordinate desire to live his life without the fear of
losing it, but his status in Roman law as property meant he could never live such a life.
Had the slave been virtuous he instead would have stoically accepted the fate that God
had ordained for him, for God is the only good the slave could never lose. Augustine's
argument removes attention from the overt act and redirects it toward the psychology of
the individual, but it also creates a tacit distinction between intention and desire. The
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slave desired to live without fear rather than the death of his master, but in protecting
himself with violence he clearly did intend to kill his master. Even so, Augustine was
much more concerned to clarifY that the sin emerged from inordinate desires for
phantasms without real existence, but through his immense influence on later medieval
thought Augustine conditioned subsequent moralists to see sin as something interior to
the human being rather than as an act.
Heloise also directed Abelard to a consideration of the distinction between inner
thoughts and outward actions within the widespread twelfth-century concern over
hypocrisy. She explained that she had never wished to marry him, for their marriage
rather than their affair was the true source of misery:
And if the name of wife appears more sacred and more valid, sweeter to me is
ever the word friend, or, if thou be not ashamed, concubine or whore .... I call
God to witness, if Augustus, ruling over the whole world, were to deem me
worthy of the honour of marriage, and to confirm the whole world to me, to be
ruled by me for ever, dearer to me and of greater dignity would it seem to be
called thy strumpet than his empress. 199
So long as they remained unmarried their relationship was based on love and fully
voluntary. After they formalized their vows, the relationship became compulsory,
regardless of whatever their feelings may have been. 20o As such, Heloise would have
preferred to remain Abelard's mistress, an arrangement she saw as authentic, rather than
wed her hypothetical Augustus for the sake of status and power. According to canon law
fornication was of course sinful while marriage was virtuous, but Heloise disagreed,
because the ethical value of the act came from the mind rather than the act. She also
echoed Augustine's distinction between desire and intention more forcefully, claiming "it
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is the intention that makes the crime. It is not what is done but the spirit in which it is
done that equity considers. ,,201 Heloise might claim that sex as an act was not inherently
sinful, nor was the intention to carry on a relationship, but desiring marriage to appease
the sensibilities of others or as means of securing power or an alliance was duplicitous
and therefore sinful. Abelard had to consider these distinctions for any moral theory, but
just as Gratian collected and codified canon law by resolving its contradictions, Abelard
compiled rather than invented these distinctions into a cohesive theory of sin.
However sin might be defined, no understanding of it could be achieved without a
juxtaposition between it and God's nature. Anything sinful ultimately was so, because it
was offensive to God. For the dualist heretics anything material was sinful, because the
true God was pure spirit while the creator was evil. Abelard believed he had already
demonstrated the unity of the Trinity which subverted the heretics' claims. A unity of
God's power, wisdom, and benevolence could not allow the dichotomy between a
malevolent creator and benevolent non-creator. A more thorough proof of God's supreme
goodness and power would not only undermine the heretical view that God created an
evil material world out of cruelty, it would also have powerful implications for arguments
on sin and virtue. Abelard provided this proof in the last of his theological monographs,
the Theologia "Scholarium." Like Sic et Non, Abelard wrote this work as a series of
theological quandaries. In structure it greatly resembles Lombard's Sentences but it is
much less systematic and thorough, thus providing an example of a collection of more
casual, less structured quaestiones. One of Abelard's quaestiones considers the issue of
determinism by asking whether God can do other than what he does.

201 Moncrief[, The Letters ofAbelard and Heloise, 58.

90

By defining God as good through the benignity of the Holy Spirit, Abelard
logically had to accept that anything God did was good for him to do while anything he
avoided doing was good for him not to do, therefore "it seems that he can only do or omit
what he does or does omit. For ifit is good that he omit what he omits, then it is not
good for him to do the same thing, and consequently he cannot do it.,,202 Since goodness
is essential to God's existence, he cannot act in any way contrary to this property any
more than Socrates could be both ration and irrational. While it seems Abelard violated
divine omnipotence by placing a a strict, externally defined limit on God's capacity to
act, he reasons that human potential is actually a lack of perfection. Human goodness is
accidental rather than essential, for humans have potential which they mayor may not
fulfill. That humans may potentially act in ways other than they do illustrates their
unfulfilled potential which renders humans imperJectus or "incomplete." God is fully
complete, fully actualized, and possessing no potential he may only do what he does do.
Abelard understood that human beings may potentially do many things God cannot "like
eat, walk, or even sin, things which are totally removed from the power of divinity and
completely foreign to his dignity.,,203 God is perfect rather than limited by lacking these
types of potential. Since God does what he wills, and everything he does is good, what
God wills must also be good. Anything God does not will is at least not good, though it
may even be evil. God created the material world through his will, and it thus must be
good otherwise he could not have willed it. Though an obsession with the physical world
may originate in an excessive love for a secondary good if it eclipses the value an
individual places on spiritual matters, merely avoiding the material world could not be
202 Bosley and Tweedale, Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy, 19.
203 Ibid., 21.
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construed as morally exemplary behavior. Abelard had also stumbled upon further
implications for his own ethical theories. If God is good and what he wills is good, his
will must have some bearing on the goodness of human acts.
Abelard's Scito te Ipsum, a late work consisting of one lengthy book on the nature
of sin and one short, incomplete book on the nature of virtue, illustrates Abelard's
thinking on the distinctions between sin, acts, intentions and desires. 204 The foibles of the
human mind will always make sin and its scandals far more interesting to study than
virtue, but the nature of sin was a more pressing concern in any case. Despite the
differences which separated heretic and orthodox believer or Abelard and Heloise from
the the more conservative Gregorian reform clergy, most everyone could agree virtue at
least included avoiding sin. From his previous training and logic, Abelard understood
words like "sin," "vice," or "fault" might be used in ways which did not serve his
purposes. Augustine had recognized that anything common to all people cannot be good
in itself. Abelard applied this thinking to the minor imperfections of the human being
like weakness of body or memory which are not sinful, since they "befall the wicked and
the good alike" and do not "make life base or honorable. "205 Augustine had said sin was a
lack of goodness, and these weaknesses are definitely deficiencies of something good to
possess, but they are nevertheless not sins.
According to Abelard moral weaknesses or even bad actions are also not sins in
themselves. A vice such as a quick temper may predispose the individual who possess it
to sin, but such vices can be overcome with concerted effort. Due to human imperfection

204 Burge, Heloise and Abelard, 106; Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, 215.
205 Peter Abelard's Ethics: An Edition with introduction, English translation, and notes by D.E. Luscombe
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971),3.
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such vices are just a part of every person and do not render a person sinful for possessing
them.206 The presence of such deficiencies within the human character allows for the
possibility of virtue, since by "triumphing over themselves through the virtue of
temperance they may obtain a crown.,,207 Sin must lie in something other than a simple
deficiency or weakness.
These weakness of character may lead an individual to either do something
unfitting or to omit to do something fitting. Abelard defined the consent to inappropriate
action as sin: "Now this consent we properly call sin, that is, the fault of the soul by
which it earns damnation or is made guilty before God. For what is that consent unless it
is contempt of God and an offense against him?,,208 By definition then sin is the consent
to act out of contempt for God, but this definition requires some concrete examples
before its principles can logically be applied to real situations. Abelard made use of
Augustine's earlier example of the slave who killed his master, but reinterpreted it
according to his own theory. Augustine claimed the slave had an inordinate desire to live
free from fear, but Abelard claimed he sinned "in consenting to an unjust killing which he
should have undergone rather than have inflicted. ,,209 Abelard intensifies the distinction
between desire and intention that had been latent in Augustine'S argument. The slave did
not desire to kill the lord, but rather to protect his own life. Neither of these desires is
sinful according to Abelard's definition. He did, however, intend to kill, and this
intention is most definitely against God's will. 210 The role Abelard attributes to intention

206 Ibid., 5.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid., 9
210 Brower and Guilfoy, The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, 282-284; Marenbon, The Philosophy of
Peter Abelard, 262.
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has led other scholars to label his work as "intentionalist" ethics, and though Abelard
clearly believed a bad intention led to sin, his ever logical mind did not admit to a bland
subjectivity in which an action would be labeled evil if the actor intended something
harmful. The slave intended no malice; his homicide was merely a means to an end, yet
Abelard still vituperates him. Sin is rather consent to the contempt of God. Since God is
objectively good, the principles behind Abelard's ethics remain objective. 211 It is God's
thinking about the intention that counts, not the sinner's.
Abelard gave much less attention to defining virtue in the second book of his
ethics but did treat it more fully in his Collationes or Collections, an earlier dialogue
which is not complete. 212 Sometimes referenced under the alternative title of A Dialogue
between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, Abelard framed the work as a dialogue

between the titular participants with himself acting as judge. The Jew and Christian each
have a tum arguing against a proponent of pagan philosophy who identifies himself as a
circumcised descendant and Ishmael, likely indicating to Abelard's audience that he was
at least from Islamic lands if not a practicing Muslim.213 The inclusion of a Jew and a
Christian in the debate again highlights the twelfth-century ethical concern for the
possible discontinuity between outward act and inner intention. While sin was consent to
contempt of God's will, virtue was not simple acceptance of God's will.
The philosopher prefers to follow the natural law which God as author of the
world has ordained for it. The Jew of course observes the Mosaic Law. God established
each of these laws to govern human behavior, but the first debate between the
211 Clanchy,Abelard, 84; Brooke, The Tweljih CentulJ' Renaissance, 49.
212 Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 220.
213 John Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the
West (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), 302.
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philosopher and Jew illustrates that they alone are not sufficient for virtue. The
philosopher believes that Mosaic Law is superfluous, but the Jew maintains that Mosaic
Law is an improvement over natural law in that it encourages the development of love:
Reflect therefore, I beg you, on the basis of these on how far the law extends the
feeling of love both to people and to God, and you will realize that your law too
which you call "natural," is included within ours: so that, even if all the other
commandments were put aside, then for us just as for you those which concern
perfect love would be enough for salvation. You do not deny that our earliest
patriarchs were saved by them, and so you should accept that we can be all the
surer of salvation because the other added commands of the law have established
a stricter way of life for us. These added laws, it seems to me, are concerned not
so much with what constitutes a holy way of life for us as with safeguarding it.
The true love of God and of our fellow humans is indeed all that is needed for
every virtue of the mind, and even if there are no outward action~" the merit ofa
good and perfect will is in no way diminished.214
According to the Jew the law is a means to an end; it prevents people from faltering into
sin and teaches them to love God and neighbor. To counter the philosopher claims
following the law as a guide to life is impossible, since "you would not be able to go
through a single day of the present life nor carry out your domestic responsibilities for
one day, since we have to do many things-buying, carrying out business, going from
here to there, to say nothing of eating and sleeping, about which there are no
commandments."215 Without the hindrance of a judging God the philosopher may
dispense with any warnings of divine punishment, but as a follower of the natural law, he
is concerned with civic virtue and personal responsibility whose maintenance he feels the
Mosaic Law inhibits. From this perspective the Jew's argument appears selfish; his law
may confirm a relationship between the individual and God, but it does little to protect
the interests of others in the community. Following the law may make the devotee appear
214 Peter Abelard, Ethical Writings: His Ethics or "Know Yourself" and His Dialogue between a
Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, trans. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995),53.
215 Ibid., 69.
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good, but without proper attention directed to the care of others the Jew's claims that the
law increases love ring hollow.
The philosopher is similarly perturbed by the laws concerning sacrifices. An
individual who loves God and neighbor should already be holy, and so making sacrifices
adds nothing good to the soul. The outward observance of the law is thus empty "so far
as the salvation of the soul is concerned, nor is there any doubt that, when true love of
God and neighbor has made someone just, there is no longer any guilt for sin in him
which would require spiritual purification."216 According to the philosopher God wants
pure intentions more than simple observations of religious law.
Abelard seems to be giving the philosopher the better argument, especially given
his own concerns with hypocrisy which emerged during his correspondence with Heloise
and with the role of intention and desire in moral actions. Nevertheless, neither the
philosopher nor Jew should be making especially convincing arguments. As nonChristians they are both heathen, and Abelard likely intended his audience to dismiss
much of what they said but in such a way so as not to dismiss the kernel of truth they
each had. What Abelard could tacitly claim was that observation of the external forms of
religion did serve a purpose but the performance of these religious duties were
insufficient to establish virtue.
The succeeding debate between the philosopher and Christian more explicitly
defines virtue. Like Boethius and Aristotle the philosopher defines vice and virtue as "a
quality which is not naturally in a thing, but is acquired by care and deliberation and
leaves the thing only with great difficulty.,,217 The Christian agrees that virtue requires a
216 Ibid., 71.
217 Ibid., 129.
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struggle. Aristotle defined virtue as an acquired habit rather than an innate condition that
is difficult to mitigate once established but a struggle to gain. 218 The Christian claims that
any state may be classified as good if it accomplishes something, evil if it obstructs
something, or indifferent ifit does neither. 219 Virtue then must be an acquired habit which
accomplishes something. Abelard's decision to include an indifferent state as a
possibility is interesting, since indifference had not been much considered in ethical
theories since the Stoics. "Indifferent" here refers to an act which cannot be classified as
either good or bad. 220
Virtuous actions are those which accomplish something related to God's divine
plan: "For it is not good that someone does well, ifhis doing it does not fit with any
divine plan but, rather obstructs it, because that which lacks a reasonable cause for why it
is done cannot be done well. And something lacks a reasonable cause for why it is done
when it would be necessary that something planned by God would be impeded, were it to
happen."22I Virtue then is not simply fulfilling God's commandments, but rather an
action which contributes to God's plan. Much of the squabbling between the heretics and
the orthodox certainly did nothing to accomplish God's plan. The heretics clearly were
wrong. Augustine and Orosius had revealed that history was the unfurling of God's plan
for the world. 222 Following the Church therefore contributed to this plan while dissenting
from it initiated a discontinuity into history which was something wicked. Abelard
established in the Theologia "Scholarium" that God only willed what was good. God
willed the Church to occupy a special place among western historical institutions.
218 Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 179.
219 Abelard, Ethical Writings, 205-207.
220 Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 185.
221 Abelard, Ethical Writings, 223.
222 Nonnan F. Cantor, ed. The Medieval World. 300 -1300 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1968),46.
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Heretics moved against divine providence in a way that threatened to destroy Christian
unity. Even though they might desire to work no evil and intend only to follow their
conscience, the heretics' intention led them to sin, since following their conscience in this
case led to an objective which was opposed to God's will.
Abelard was not alone in devoting attention to the study of ethics. The continued
needs of the reform movement to reinstate discipline and deal with dissent made ethics a
serious pursuit just as it had reinvigorated the study oflogic and theology. Anselm of
Bec in Cur Deus Homo claimed that "to sin is nothing else than not to render God his
due. ,,223 Like Augustine, Anselm had defined sin as a lack of something, but in this case a
lack of justice rather than of virtue. 224 William of Champeaux, Abelard's former
instructor, claimed God had given humanity freedom, and therefore an individual could
choose to go against God's commandments. The responsibility for such poor choices of
course rests with the individual rather than God.225 These theories of sin as a lack of
something absolved God of any responsibility for sin. Such arguments were necessary to
combat heretical dualism that claimed the creator God made all things including sin to
cause human suffering. The state of the individual sinner had to become more central to
such arguments, since eliminating any claim that God might be responsible for evil
required placing the blame on the sinner, and thus considerations of the sinner apart from
his reprehensible behavior, such as Abelard's concern for intention or William's for
freedom, became necessary to sustain the argument.
Perhaps the most sophisticated of this new type of ethical theory came from

223 Deane, Basic Writings, 202.
224 Marenbon, The Philosophy ofPeter Abelard, 253.
225 Ibid.

98

Anselm of Laon, who in this area was not the dullard Abelard presents with regard to
theology. Anslem claimed sin occurred in stages. The desire to commit a sin must
precede any sinful action, because no one acts without will, but the desire itself is not
sinful. When the person begins to seriously consider or plan to commit a sin so does the
sin begin. At this stage the sinner has given consent of the will. The cycle completes
when the sinner acts on the desire and commits the act. 226 Anselm takes this stage theory
of sin further in arguing that this process results not only in the moral evil of intentional
human actions but also the natural evil of the world: "While man retained the natural
power of generation, he turned this quality of goodness into corruption by his sin, and
thus could beget nothing but corruption from the corrupt mass.,,227 Humanity, by
introducing sin into the world, brought about the corruption that replaced God's earthly
paradise with the present condition of suffering and toil it must endure. God did not
create an imperfect world he then forced human beings to inhabit. The goodness of
God's creation had always to be maintained both to refute the claims of dualist heretics
and to remain consistent with the theological definition of God's essential goodness.
However complex Anselm's ethical theory may be, it still claims that sin reaches maturity
in the final act. He did examine the role of intention, but used it only to explain a stage in
the process. Abelard differed in this regard by divorcing the act from any inherent moral
value and placing all the focus on the intention.
Abelard perhaps went further than his contemporaries in shifting emphasis away
from overt actions toward interior phenomena, but he was not alone in this shift. His
thoroughness in embracing an intentionalist ethics epitomizes a much larger twelfth226 Ibid., 253-254.
227 Fairweather, A Scholastic Miscellany, 261.
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century trend brought about by changes within the Church that came with reform and the
challenges of religious dissent. Abelard additionally had many personal reasons for
beginning a study of intentionalist ethics. His correspondence with Heloise brought forth
questions as to how someone who had done what was usually praised as a good act could
feel a sense of shame for having done so. Heloise had not strictly intended to act in way
contrary to God's will after entering the convent, but she did continue her amorous
longings for her former lover, and their relationship had most certainly been contrary to
God's will according to the standards of the period. Abelard also had to consider
behavior beside his own. His brothers at St. Denis apparently did not meet his standards
of piety or morality while his own monks at St. Gildas attempted to murder him for his
ethical prudishness. In this too Abelard was not so different from his contemporaries;
like many other religious figures of the period he called for a return to monastic
discipline, one of both the heart and body. Just as he attempted to solve a rational
problem with regard to the Trinity, so too did Abelard desire a logical ethical system to
instruct those leading the religious life how to live properly and admonish those who did
not.
Abelard had other personal reasons for pursuing a study of ethics besides the
considerations related to his office. His personal difficulties had been severe; he needed
to know that the universe was somehow a rational place. If God were rational and
accessible to human reason, if he only did what was fitting for him to will, if he punished
what was not fitting for human beings, Abelard's sufferings would make sense rather than
seem random and irrational. 228 Abelard's contemporaries did not face the difficulties he

228 Moore, The First European Revolution, 113.
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did. Anselm of Laon, William of Champeaux, and Bernard all enjoyed positions of
power and respect within the Church while Abelard, who behaved in much the same way
they did after he entered St. Denis, met with no such success except for his reputation
among his students. A God who judged behavior rather than intention would seem
capricious indeed. Much of Abelard's special insight must have come from the
circumstances of his life which led him to read the moral exemplars from scripture and
patristic sources in a new light.
This new light, while perhaps extreme in its emphasis on intention, was not so far
out of the mainstream for the time. Even Augustine found sin had to consist of more than
a simple act. The times demanded new moral theories to keep the behavior of those
leading the religious life in check and end the alternative ethical theories of twelfthcentury heretics. Abelard fulfilled a need entirely consistent with those of his day.
Considering intention as the sine qua non of sin made his task simpler; he never had to
provide arguments or claims of how his own argument stood against the counterpoint of
the possibility of inherently bad actions that are sinful regardless of the intention. A
logician's mind prefers to limit the possibilities to a few cases from the beginning, which
Abelard did by following typical scholastic formulae, distinguishing sin from actions,
weakness of character, or negative inclinations.
Abelard's simplification along with the rediscovery of Aristotle's ethical writingss
prevented Abelard's ethical theory from exerting much influence on the future of
scholastic ethics. By not considering the possibility of inherently evil acts he had not
been as thorough as he should have been. It also left him open to the charge of
Pelgianism, the heresy which claims human beings can be morally perfect without divine
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grace. On the subject of lust with which Abelard was so well acquainted he claimed:
"For he who says, 'Do not pursue your lusts, and tum away from your will,' commanded
us not to satisfy our lusts, but not to do without them altogether. For satisfying them is
wicked, but going without them is impossible in our feeble state. And so it isn't the
lusting after a woman but the consenting to the lust that is the sin. It isn't the will to have
sex with her that is damnable but the will's consent.,,229 Though admitting that humanity
is innately weak, by claiming that lust itself is not innately sinful Abelard failed to
account for the role of original sin or the need for Christ's sacrifice in a way the Church
found acceptable. He had placed too much value on reason and had not reconciled reason
with faith.
Even if Abelard's ethical theory had not been condemned at Sens along with his
theology, it still would have been unlikely to have had much influence. Abelard's ethics
often stand apart from other examples from the middle ages due to considerations of the
thirteenth century as the standard for medieval thought. By the days of Thomas Aquinas
and Albertus Magnus the entirety of Aristotle's work including his ethical writings had
been recovered, and scholars gave much more attention to resolving the contradictions
between Aristotelian and Christian ethics than considering the role of intention in sin and
virtue. Perhaps the considerable attention historians and philosophers of the twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries have paid to Abelard's ethical writings comes not from
any innovation or influence upon the thought of the twelfth century, but from the degree
to which Abelard's views remain compatible with those of the twentieth century through
their emphasis on intention.

229 Abelard, Ethical Writings, 6.
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CONCLUSION

The oft repeated claim that Abelard was a highly original thinker who exercised
great influence on the progression of medieval philosophy has considerable force behind
it. Abelard was always popular with his own students, argued bitterly with his
instructors, lived a scandalous personal life, and was twice tried for heresy. He argued
from a position of formal reason in opposition to his contemporaries reliance on revealed
truth. Indeed, many of Abelard's contemporaries feared his continued use of formal
reason, because it shifted emphasis away from faith toward the human mind like some
gnostic heresy. Abelard believed he had sufficient justification for his methods. As 1.G.
Sikes says, "If the existence of God is accessible to human reason, then the non-Christian
has no more excuse than the Christian for disbelief.,,230 Abelard's method seems so
innovative in comparison to his immediate predecessors and contemporaries, because it
often resembles a twentieth century way of arguing: words are not things, meaning
depends on the speakers intent, the morality of an action depends on its motive. Unlike a
twentieth century thinker, however, Abelard was not a relativism, nor did he embrace
logic to disprove religion.
Any claim as to Abelard's originality must consider the corpus of his intellectual
work, for what is true of the man is not necessarily true of his thought. Abelard dedicated
much of his concern for logic to the problem of universals, probably the most pressing
philosophical problem of the twelfth century. Though Abelard questioned the prevailing
realism of his day, so did many other scholars including his first master oflogic Roscelin.
230 Sikes, Peter Abelard, 116.
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Having been taught by William of Champeaux and Roscelin, polar opposites on the
continuum between realism and nominalism, Abelard accepted many of their claims and
combined them to form his own. The borrowing represents an ambivalence. Though
Otto of Freising claimed Abelard "would scarcely so demean himself as to descend from
the heights of his mind to listen to his teachers,"231 that he kept so many of their
assumptions displays Abelard's trust in his instructors' views. While Abelard's argument
on universals is certainly sophisticated and thus clearly the work of a powerful mind, it
was not a highly innovative view. Roscelin had already attacked realism in a far more
thorough assault than Abelard made, and the increasing intellectual sophistication of
Europe in the twelfth century made questioning the traditional view of universals a
popular pursuit. Abelard's argument is one of the most thorough and coherent attacks on
twelfth-century realism, but it represents the height of the era's intellectual power rather
than its author's creativity. John of Salisbury records in the Metalogicon that even years
after Abelard had died, his solution to the problem was merely another topic for debate at
Notre Dame. Abelard's solution had not replaced the previous answers provided by
Roscelin and William. 232
Theology even more so than logic was an area where excessive novelty could be a
danger. Abelard himself would doubtlessly claim that his arguments on the Trinity were
reflections of patristic thinking rather than his own opinions, for remaining orthodox
meant supporting any claim with a mass of authoritative evidence. Abelard shared many
of the assumptions of his sources, especially the idea that the problem of the Trinity was
231 Otto of Freising, The Deeds ofFrederick Barbarossa, trans. Charles Christopher Mierow (New York:
w.w. Norton, 1966),83.
232 Daniel D. McGarry, trans., The Metalogicon ofJohn ofSalisbwy: A TwelJih-Century Defense of the
Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), 112-113.
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really a problem of identity and distinction just as Augustine and Boethius had. To a
great degree, Abelard's arguments on the Trinity are not complete. He demonstrates a
variety of ways that things may be the same or different, but does not arrive at a certain
conclusion as to how this manifests in the Trinity. Marcus and Tullius may indeed be
Cicero, and the Father and the Son may both be God, but such a claim does not fully
clarify the appropriate unity and distinction among the Persons.
Abelard's ethical treatises may be his most original. His Collationes were
dialogues rather than treatises, but his Scito Te Jpsum was much more consistent with his
style as well as that of the time. The content of both considered the role of intention in
determining the moral value of actions, a topic much considered at the time. The
intellectual context of the twelfth century demanded some consideration of intention to
resolve the questions raised by hypocrisy and the moral views of heretical dualism which
the Church found unacceptable. Abelard gave intention far more weight than other
twelfth-century intellectuals, but he was not alone in considering intention. Abelard had
ample reason to write on ethics given his experiences with Heloise, his brothers at St.
Denis, and his own monks at St. Gildas. The scandals of Abelard's life certainly supplied
him with insights, but he was influenced by the intellectual context of the twelfth century
and allowed the demands of the time to shape his views.
The level of Abelard's influence is significantly easier to determine than his
originality. Two condemnations for heresy prevented his writings from exerting much
influence after his death. Anyone who attempted to quote Abelard in the immediate
aftermath of Sens would have been found highly suspect. By the thirteenth century and
the recovery of Aristotle, scholars spent most of their energy resolving the new sources
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with Christianity and writing commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Even so,
Abelard taught many students during his lifetime who may be expected to have absorbed
something of their master's methods ifnot his conclusions. The organization of
Abelard's writing closely mirrors the typical dialectical arrangement of medieval
philosophical treatises, and it is quite likely this is something he learned from Roscelin,
though the seeds of the scholastic method may be seen in both Augustine and Boethius.
Abelard certainly cannot be credited with inventing the scholastic method, nor was he its
only twelfth-century proponent. Gratian and Peter Lombard also used it extensively and
to much greater effect. Their work in resolving the discord among authorities was part of
the twelfth-century intellectual context. Between the secular knowledge of the ancients
and the revealed truth of Christ, all truth had already been recorded; it merely remained
for scholars to piece these bits of knowledge together and resolve their contradictions.
Subsequent philosophers had several examples of the scholastic method even without
reference to Abelard's writing.
What remains is the question of why Abelard has been consistently described by
historians and philosophers as influential and original. While philosophers frequently do
consider the historical context of a subject of their study, those who examine Abelard are
usually far more interested in his arguments than how the events of his life and times may
have shaped them. Why historians have written so voluminously on Abelard is another
matter. A large portion of the issue lies in the same problem which plagues all historical
research: the availability of sources. Not all of Abelard's writing survives, but large
portions of it do while the writings of his contemporaries are often more fragmentary.
Any scholar wishing to research anti-realist philosophy need only consult Abelard,
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because Roscelin's work does not survive. Much of Abelard's reputation thus stems from
the fact that only his documents survive.
Abelard also wrote a variety of types of documents. Besides his philosophical
work, he composed an autobiography in which he reveals that intellectual competition in
the twelfth century was really quite fierce, his letters to Heloise along with liturgical
hymns, and advice for his son Astralabe. Such a variety of composition makes Abelard
seem more human than many of the other major players in twelfth-century intellectual
life. Excessive attention to all these sources without documents written by other people
of the day skews the perspective in Abelard's favor, especially since other intellectual
documents of the twelfth century that survive are often less impressive than Abelard's
own writing.
Besides the availability of Abelard's writing, the content of the Historia
Calamitatum and his letters to Heloise is often more exciting than anything from any

other source from the period. Abelard fully reveals himself to be quite human and vexed
by serious character flaws like any other human. Abelard does not write of himself as an
archetype, but speaks of his emotions and thoughts in a way that makes him quite
charismatic despite-or perhaps because of-his obvious flaws. A dramatic telling does
not render a story inherently original, but it can blind its audience to its true nature. The
circumstances of Abelard's life are certainly unique, but he was surely not the only figure
of the twelfth century who led an interesting life. He just happens to be one of few
people who left an intimate account of it that we know of. This forceful personality
found in the pages of the Historia Calamitatum can exert a powerful influence on the
unwary reader. It is perhaps natural if not objective to identify with Abelard and his
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suffering and thus ascribe disproportionate weight to his intellectual work based on the
assumption that a man who leads an interesting life must have merit in other ways as
well.
Abelard's eventful personal life wins him a high amount of attention, but
historians allow themselves to fall into fallacious thinking if they consider his intellectual
work too highly because of this. Abelard's weighty contribution to history is his
intellectual work, but the contents of it are often misunderstood or ignored in favor of the
scandalous events of his life that make for such interesting reading. A genetic fallacy,
this type of reasoning has resulted in Abelard enjoying greater attention from historians
than they usually show other twelfth-century intellectuals, which eventually leads to the
conclusion that his work merits the extra attention. Abelard's intellectual work does
deserve attention, but its qualities are often exaggerated because of Abelard's affair with
Heloise and two heresy trials make him so atypical for his day. Abelard's status as a
celebrity should not influence the historical view of his philosophy, which was entirely
consistent with the mentality of his time.
Without the veneer oflover or heretic to cloud the judgment, another side of
Abelard can show forth. Abelard was not an original thinker because he neither wanted
nor needed to be. Abelard was not a professor in the modem understanding of the term.
He was, however, a great teacher. The publishing requirements of professors often
detract from their teaching, though it does allow them to research and push their
disciplines to greater heights. Abelard did not compose for his academic peers, but for
his own students. Teaching may require creativity in presentation, but it does not require
innovation with regard to content. Abelard attempted to build and expand a career by
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teaching students the skills they needed within the context of the reformed Church.
Abelard's works are textbooks meant to assist this goal. While great teachers can have
great influence, Abelard's school did not endure long after his death. Abelard's notoriety
may have gained him much attention from historians, but it won him the disapproval of
the religious authorities. After Sens, Abelard lost whatever influence he might have had
on future generations. He could not teach and his students could not continue to advocate
for his ideas. The schools of Laon and St. Victor acquired greater influence due to the
loss of a competitor while Abelard's texts faded into obscurity until they were rendered
largely obsolete by the recovery of Aristotle. Abelard's career required that he adopt
some standardization rather than innovation, but contingency ended his influence.
Abelard the teacher was a thoroughly twelfth-century man in nearly all his
characteristics. Though education greatly increased in importance in the twelfth century,
it was education of harmonization and codification rather than the creation of new lines
of inquiry. Much of Abelard's writing and suffering sounds very much like a twentiethcentury scholar, but historians fall into anachronisms when they see Abelard as so much
like themselves that they believe the similarities between their ideas and Abelard's
indicates that he was almost entirely consistent with the context of their own time. A
historical reconstruction of Abelard must not only focus on his personal life, but must
also account for his intellectual contributions and historical context.
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